September 15, 2020

Chief Justice Mark E. Recktenwald  
Associate Justice Paula A. Nakayama  
Associate Justice Sabrina S. McKenna  
Associate Justice Michael D. Wilson  
Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i  
Judiciary Communications and Community Relations Office  
417 South King Street  
Honolulu, Hawai‘i 96813

RE: Comment Letter Opposing Proposed Hawai‘i Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(h)  
and Proposed New Section 15 to the Guidelines of Professional Courtesy and Civility

Dear Chief Justice Recktenwald, Justice Nakayama, Justice McKenna, and Justice Wilson:

This comment letter is filed pursuant to the Court’s request for public comment regarding proposals received from the Commission on Professionalism to amend Rule 8.4 of the Hawai‘i Rules of Professional Conduct by adding Proposed Rule 8.4(h) or, in the alternative, to add a new Section 15 to the Guidelines of Professional Courtesy and Civility for Hawai‘i Lawyers.

Christian Legal Society (CLS) is a national association of Christian attorneys, law students, and law professors, founded in 1961, to help lawyers and law students integrate their faith with their practice of law. CLS’s membership includes attorneys who practice law in Hawai‘i. Women constitute a significant percentage of CLS’s attorney and law student members and leaders. Its current president and immediate past president are women who have practiced law for a number of years. CLS opposes harassment and discrimination against any woman in the legal profession.

Overview

Because Proposed Rule 8.4(h) is rooted in the deeply flawed and highly criticized ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), CLS opposes its adoption. CLS also opposes addition of the language as a new Section 15 to the Guidelines of Professional Courtesy and Civility. Due to free speech concerns, as well as prudential policy considerations, CLS urges the Court not to adopt Proposed Rules 8.4(h) because it will inevitably have a chilling effect on Hawai‘i attorneys’ speech regarding political, ideological, religious, and social issues to the detriment of Hawai‘i attorneys and their clients. A free civil society needs attorneys who can speak their minds freely without fear of losing their license to practice law.
To appreciate the problems with Proposed Rule 8.4(h), CLS commends for the Court’s consideration the recent, careful analysis of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) by Professor Michael McGinniss, Dean of the University of North Dakota School of Law, entitled *Expressing Conscience with Candor: Saint Thomas More and First Freedoms in the Legal Profession*, 42 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 173 (2019).\(^1\) Dean McGinniss “examine[d] multiple aspects of the ongoing Model Rule 8.4(g) controversy, including the rule’s background and deficiencies, states’ reception (and widespread rejection) of it, [and] socially conservative lawyers’ justified distrust of new speech restrictions.”\(^2\)

But lawyers who identify as “socially liberal” should also be concerned about Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s sweeping implications. For example, attorneys who serve on their firm’s hiring committee and make any employment decision in which, in order to achieve diversity goals, even modest preference is given based on race, sex, religion, or sexual orientation would be in violation of the rule.\(^3\) Or an attorney who used a common but hurtful sexual term in a tweet aimed at the President’s spokeswoman could be subject to discipline.\(^4\) Or a law professor whose comments to the media inaccurately stereotyped the opponents of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), by race or gender, could be subject to discipline.\(^5\)

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\(^2\) *Id.* at 173.

\(^3\) Thomas Spahn, a highly respected professional ethics expert, has concluded that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) “prohibits such discrimination as women-only bar groups or networking events, minority-only recruitment days or mentoring sessions, etc.” He further concluded that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) would prohibit any discrimination in hiring practices:

> Many of us operating under the old ABA Model Rules Comments or similar provisions either explicitly or sub silentio treated race, sex, or other listed attributes as a “plus” when deciding whom to interview, hire, or promote within a law firm or law department. That is discrimination. It may be well-intentioned and designed to curry favor with clients who monitor and measure law firms’ head count on the basis of such attributes – but it is nevertheless discrimination. *In every state that adopts the new ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), it will become an ethics violation.*


\(^5\) Eugene Volokh, *Professor Stephen Gillers (NYU) Unwittingly Demonstrates Why ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) Chills Protected Speech*, The Volokh Conspiracy, June 17, 2019, [https://reason.com/2019/06/17/professor-stephen-gillers-nyu-unwittingly-demonstrates-why-aba-model-rule-8-4g-chills-protected-speech/](https://reason.com/2019/06/17/professor-stephen-gillers-nyu-unwittingly-demonstrates-why-aba-model-rule-8-4g-chills-protected-speech/). The article explains that in a media interview regarding ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), a proponent of the Rule (inaccurately) stereotyped opponents of the Rule by race and gender, and suggests that the same comment made in the context of a bar association debate might be grounds for discipline under ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).
Sadly, we live at a time when many people, including lawyers, are willing to suppress the free speech of those with whom they disagree. Some lawyers purportedly have filed bar complaints in order to harass officeholders whose political views they dislike.

In July 2020, after receiving a comment letter signed by approximately 300 judges, the Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct withdrew a draft advisory opinion that had said it was improper for judges to be members in the Federalist Society or the American Constitution Society. In withdrawing its proposal, the Committee noted that “judges confront a world filled with challenges arising out of emerging technologies, deep ideological disputes, a growing sense of mistrust of individuals and institutions, and an ever-changing landscape of competing political, legal and societal interests.”

Many proponents of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and its derivative rules, such as Proposed Rule 8.4(h), sincerely believe that the Rule will only be used to punish lawyers who are bad actors. Unfortunately, we have recently witnessed too many times when people are punished, and their livelihoods placed at risk, for holding traditional religious views that may be currently disfavored by the popular culture. The Fire Chief of Atlanta, an African American man who had been appointed National Fire Marshal by President Obama, was fired because he wrote a book that briefly mentioned his religious beliefs regarding marriage and sexual conduct. The CEO of Mozilla lost his position because he made a contribution to one side of a political debate regarding marriage laws.

Indeed, simply supporting the concept of freedom of speech has itself become controversial, as became obvious in July when well-known liberal signatories to a public letter

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6 See, e.g., Aaron Haviland, “I Thought I Could Be a Christian and Constitutionalist at Yale Law School. I Was Wrong,” The Federalist (Mar. 4, 2019), https://thefederalist.com/2019/03/04/thought-christian-constitutionalist-yale-law-school-wrong/ (student president of Yale Law School chapter of the Federalist Society describing significant harassment by other Yale Law students and student organizations because they did not like the ideas that they ascribed (accurately or inaccurately) to Federalist Society members and guest speakers).


Ordinary ethics complaints have the capacity to ruin individual law careers and serve as cautionary examples to other lawyers. Ethics Resistance complaints have the additional capacity to prompt official action, alter staffing decisions at the highest levels of government, influence high-ranking lawyers’ willingness to comply with investigations, and terminate or preempt relationships between lawyers and the politically powerful.

Most importantly, they can change public perception regarding the moral integrity of an administration. And they can do this even if they do not result in a sanction.


9 Testimony Before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on Religious Freedom & The First Amendment Defense Act, 114th Cong. (July 12, 2016) (statement of Kelvin J. Cochran).

supporting freedom of speech were publicly pressured to recant their support for free speech and its necessary corollary, tolerance of others’ differing beliefs.  

Given the current climate, lawyers who hold classical liberal, conservative, libertarian, or religious viewpoints, understandably are unwilling to support a black letter rule that could easily be misused to deprive them of their license to practice law. As Professor Volokh, a nationally recognized First Amendment expert, has explained, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is a speech code that threatens lawyers’ speech.

Perhaps this is why after four years of deliberations by state supreme courts and state bar associations in many states across the country, Vermont and New Mexico are the only states to have adopted ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). In contrast, at least thirteen states have concluded, after careful study, that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is both unconstitutional and unworkable. These states have opted to take the prudent course of letting other states experiment with ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) in order to evaluate its actual effect on the lawyers in those states before imposing it on their lawyers.

This letter provides numerous reasons why Proposed Rule 8.4(h) should not be adopted, including:

1. Scholars’ criticism of its progenitor, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), as a speech code for lawyers (pp. 5-8);
2. Why the differences between Proposed Rule 8.4(h) and ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) do not adequately mitigate the harm to Hawai‘i attorneys (pp. 8-14);
3. Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s unconstitutionality under the analyses in three recent United States Supreme Court decisions (pp. 14-23);
4. Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s overreach into attorneys’ lives, particularly its chilling effect on their speech and religious exercise, which is exacerbated by its use of a negligence rather than knowledge standard (pp. 23-30);
5. The fact that only Vermont and New Mexico have adopted ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), contrary to an inaccurate claim that 24 states have a similar rule (pp. 30-31);
6. The fact that official bodies in Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas have rejected ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), and Louisiana, Minnesota, and Nevada have abandoned proposals to adopt it (pp. 31-35);
7. Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s unintended consequence of making it professional misconduct for law firms to engage in hiring practices intended to achieve certain diversity goals in law firms (pp. 35-37);

12 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AfpdWmlOXbA.
8. Its ramifications for lawyers’ ability to accept, decline, or withdraw from a representation (pp. 37-39); and
9. Whether the Attorney Disciplinary Board has adequate resources to meet the potential increase in employment and other discrimination and harassment claims against attorneys and firms (pp. 39-40).

I. Scholars Have Explained that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is a Speech Code for Lawyers.

A number of scholars have accurately characterized ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) as a speech code for lawyers. For example, Professor Eugene Volokh of UCLA School of Law, a nationally recognized First Amendment expert, has summarized his view that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is a speech code that will have a serious impact on attorneys’ speech in a two-minute video for the Federalist Society.\(^\text{13}\) He also expanded on its many flaws in a debate with a proponent of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).\(^\text{14}\)

Professor Margaret Tarkington has raised strong concerns about ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s impact on attorneys’ speech. She has stressed that “[h]istorically it has been disfavored groups and minorities that have been negatively affected—and even targeted—by laws that restrict lawyers’ First Amendment rights, including African Americans during desegregation, alleged terrorists following 9/11, communists in the 1950s, welfare recipients, debtors, and criminal defendants.”\(^\text{15}\) She insists that “lawyer speech, association, and petitioning” are “rights [that] must be protected” because they “play a major role in checking the use of governmental and non-governmental power in the United States.”\(^\text{16}\)

The late Professor Ronald Rotunda, a highly respected scholar in both constitutional law and legal ethics, warned that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) threatens lawyers’ First Amendment rights.\(^\text{17}\) Regarding the new rule, he and Professor John S. Dzienkowski wrote, in the 2017-2018 edition of *Legal Ethics: The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility*, “[t]he ABA’s efforts are well intentioned, but . . . raise problems of vagueness, overbreadth, and chilling

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\(^{14}\) Debate: ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), The Federalist Society (Mar. 13, 2017), [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b074xW5kvB8&t=50s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b074xW5kvB8&t=50s).


\(^{16}\) *Id.*

protected speech under the First Amendment.” They observed that “[t]he language the ABA has adopted in Rule 8.4(g) and its associated Comments are similar to laws that the Supreme Court has invalidated on free speech grounds.” In a Wall Street Journal commentary entitled “The ABA Overrules the First Amendment,” Professor Rotunda explained:

In the case of rule 8.4(g), the standard, for lawyers at least, apparently does not include the First Amendment right to free speech. Consider the following form of “verbal” conduct when one lawyer tells another, in connection with a case, “I abhor the idle rich. We should raise capital gains taxes.” The lawyer has just violated the ABA rule by manifesting bias based on socioeconomic status.

Professor Rotunda further developed his critique in a memorandum for the Heritage Foundation entitled The ABA Decision to Control What Lawyers Say: Supporting ‘Diversity’ But Not Diversity of Thought.

Dean of the University of North Dakota School of Law Michael S. McGinniss, who teaches professional responsibility, recently “examine[d] multiple aspects of the ongoing Model Rule 8.4(g) controversy, including the rule’s background and deficiencies, states’ reception (and widespread rejection) of it, [and] socially conservative lawyers’ justified distrust of new speech restrictions.” Professor Josh Blackman has explained that “Rule 8.4(g) is unprecedented, as it extends a disciplinary committee’s jurisdiction to conduct merely ‘related to the practice of law,’ with only the most tenuous connection to representation of clients, a lawyer’s fitness, or the administration of justice.”

In a thoughtful examination of the rule’s legislative history, practitioner Andrew Halaby and Brianna Long conclude that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) “is riddled with unanswered questions, including but not limited to uncertainties as to the meaning of key terms, how it interplays with

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19 Id. at “§ 8.4-2(j)-2. The New Rule 8.4 and the Free Speech Problems It May Raise.”


22 McGinniss, supra note 1, at 173. See also, George W. Dent, Jr., Model Rule 8.4(g): Blatantly Unconstitutional and Blatantly Political, 32 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pol’y 135 (2018).

other provisions of the Model Rules, and what disciplinary sanctions should apply to a violation; as well as due process and First Amendment free expression infirmities.” They recommend that “jurisdictions asked to adopt it should think long and hard about whether such a rule can be enforced, constitutionally or at all.” And they conclude that “the new model rule cannot be considered a serious suggestion of a workable rule of professional conduct to which real world lawyers may be fairly subjected.”

In adopting its new model rule, the ABA largely ignored over 480 comment letters, most opposed to the new rule. Even the ABA’s own Standing Committee on Professional Discipline filed a comment letter questioning whether there was a demonstrated need for the rule and raising concerns about its enforceability, although the Committee dropped its opposition immediately prior to the House of Delegates’ vote.

A recurrent concern in many of the comments was the threat that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) poses to attorneys’ First Amendment rights. But little was done to address these concerns. In their thoughtful explication of the legislative history of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), Halaby and Long conclude that “the new model rule’s afflictions derive in part from indifference on the part of rule change proponents, and in part from the hasty manner in which the rule change proposal was pushed through to passage.” Specifically, the rule went through five versions, of which three versions evolved “in the two weeks before passage, none of these was subjected to review and comment by the ABA’s broader membership, the bar at large, or the public.” Halaby and Long summarized the legislative history of the rule:

Model Rule 8.4(g) and its associated comments evolved rapidly between the initial letter from the Goal III entities in July 2014, through initial circulation of Version 1 in July 2015, to final

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24 Andrew F. Halaby & Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g): Legislative History, Enforceability Questions, and a Call for Scholarship, 41 J. Legal. Prof. 201, 257 (2017).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 204.
28 Halaby & Long, supra note 24, at 220 & n.97 (listing the Committee’s concerns as including: lack of empirical evidence of need for Rule; vagueness of key terms; enforceability; constitutionality; coverage of employment discrimination complaints; mens rea requirement; and potential limitation on ability to decline representation), citing Letter from Ronald R. Rosenfeld, Chair ABA Standing Committee On Professional Responsibility, to Myles Lynk, Chair ABA Standing Committee On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Mar. 10, 2016, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_model_rule%208_4_comments/20160310%20Rosenfeld-Lynk%20SCP%20Proposed%20MABA MODEL RULE%208-4%20g%20Comments%20FINAL%20Protected.authcheckdam.pdf.
29 Halaby & Long, supra note 24, at 216-223 (summarizing concerns expressed at the only public hearing on an early version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), as well as the main concerns expressed in the comment letters).
30 Id. at 203.
31 Id.
adoption of Version 5 the following August. There was solicitation of public input only on Version 2, with only one public hearing, and ultimately with no House debate at all.\textsuperscript{32}

These scholars’ red flags should not be ignored. ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and its progeny, would dramatically shift the disciplinary landscape for Hawaiʻi attorneys.

II. The Differences Between Proposed Rule 8.4(h) and ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) Fail to Mitigate the Harm to Hawaiʻi Attorneys.

We very much appreciate the careful consideration being given to this issue, given its grave long-term consequences for Hawaiʻi attorneys. We recognize that some of the language of Proposed Rule 8.4(h) differs in places from ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), but the modest modifications do not avoid many of the constitutional and practical problems inherent in ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).

A. Like ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), Proposed Rule 8.4(h) overbroadly regulates attorneys’ communication.

ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) has been rightly criticized for the extremely broad scope of attorneys’ conduct because it regulates a lawyer’s “conduct related to the practice of law.” Its accompanying Comment [4] defines “[c]onduct related to the practice of law” as “includ[ing]”:

1. “representing clients”;
2. “interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in the practice of law”;
3. “operating or managing a law firm or law practice”; and
4. “participating in bar association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.”

On a quick reading, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) appears to differ in its scope because it regulates a lawyer’s “conduct while acting in a professional capacity.” Yet on a closer reading, its definition of “professional capacity” is nearly the same as ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s definition of “conduct related to the practice of law.” Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s definition of “professional capacity” is found in its accompanying Proposed Comment [7] which essentially repeats Comment [4] of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g):

1. “acts occurring in the course of representing clients”;
2. “interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers, or others, while engaged in the practice of law”;

\textsuperscript{32} Id. at 233.
3. “or operating or managing a law firm or law practice.”

Stripped of verbiage, the scope of both Proposed Rule 8.4(h) and ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) boils down to “interacting with . . . others while engaged in the practice of law.” “Others” is, of course, extends to everyone and makes Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s regulatory scope quite broad.

Nor does Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s omission of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s language regarding “participating in bar association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of law” narrow Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s scope. Proposed Comment [7]’s definition of “professional capacity” is not limited to the three enumerated contexts; it merely “includes” those three contexts. Nothing in Proposed Comment [7]’s definition of “professional capacity” precludes application of Proposed Rule 8.4(h) to a lawyer’s conduct while “participating in bar association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.”

Moreover, the omission of “and participating in bar association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of law” is significant only when someone is making a side-by-side comparison of Proposed Rule 8.4(h) and ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). Ten years from now, someone reading Proposed Rule 8.4(h) is unlikely to compare it to ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). Certainly, a reasonable reading of Proposed Rule 8.4(h) would support including in its scope a lawyer’s conduct while “participating in bar association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.” A reasonable reading of Proposed Rule 8.4(h) would include the scenarios that have caused ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) to be rejected in many states. See infra at pp. 31-35.

The proponents of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) have candidly observed that they sought a new black letter rule precisely because they wanted to regulate nonlitigating lawyers, such as “[a]cademics, nonprofit lawyers, and some government lawyers,” as well as “[t]ax lawyers, real estate lawyers, intellectual property lawyers, lobbyists, academics, corporate lawyers, and other lawyers who practice law outside the court system.” 33 And the proponents want the rule to apply in as many contexts as possible. By its terms, Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s scope is very broad, and nothing in its express terms limits its scope.

B. Unlike ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), Proposed Rule 8.4(h) does not purport to protect law firms’ diversity programs.

ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), in its accompanying Comment [5], attempts to rescue lawyers’ conduct from its overreach if the conduct is “undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion . . . for example, implementing initiatives aimed at recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees or sponsoring diverse law student organizations.” This “savings clause” has been

highly criticized for at least two reasons. First, it makes ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) viewpoint discriminatory and, therefore, unconstitutional.  

Second, professional ethics expert, Thomas Spahn, has explained that “ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s flat prohibition covers any discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or any of the other listed attributes” and “extends to any lawyer conduct ‘related to the practice of law,’ including ‘operating or managing a law firm or law practice.’”35 In written materials for a CLE presentation, Mr. Spahn concluded that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) “thus prohibits such discrimination as women-only bar groups or networking events, minority-only recruitment days or mentoring sessions, etc.”36 For reasons detailed infra at pp. 35-37, Mr. Spahn explains why ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s Comment [5] fails as a “savings clause” and leaves diversity programs exposed to challenge under ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).

Proposed Rule 8.4(h) does not even attempt to protect lawyers’ conduct that discriminates on the basis of its protected classes, thereby avoiding viewpoint discrimination; however, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) will prohibit various programs that have been undertaken to improve diversity for the protected classes in the legal profession. See infra at pp. 35-37.

C. Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s definition of “harassment” is even broader than ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s, and creates unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.

ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) defines “harassment” to include “derogatory or demeaning” speech. This definition violates the First Amendment’s ban on viewpoint. Proposed Rule 8.4(h) doubles down on this viewpoint discrimination by defining harassment, in Proposed Comment [8], to include not only “derogatory” and “demeaning” speech, but also “offensive” and “obnoxious” speech. But the additional terms “offensive” and “obnoxious” also viewpoint discriminatory terms that violate the First Amendment. As the Court has instructed, “It offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”37 For a more detailed explanation of this point, see infra at pp. 18-22.

D. Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s definition of “discrimination” makes it broader than ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s definition of “discrimination.”

ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is accompanied by Comment [3], which defines “discrimination” as “includ[ing] harmful verbal . . . conduct that manifests bias or prejudice towards others.” That definition itself is unconstitutional. See infra at pp. 21-22. But Proposed

34 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 1, at 206; Blackman, supra note 23, at 259.
35 The District of Columbia Bar, Continuing Legal Education Program, Civil Rights and Diversity: Ethics Issues 5-6 (July 12, 2018) (quoting Comment [4] to ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)). The written materials used in the program are on file with Christian Legal Society and may be purchased from the D.C. Bar CLE program.
36 Id. at 6.
Rule 8.4(h)’s definition of “discrimination,” found in Proposed Comment [9], is even more opaque and, therefore, fails to provide a precise constitutional standard that gives lawyers adequate notice of the speech that makes them liable to disciplinary action. Nor will those administering Proposed Rule 8.4(h) have a constitutional standard for determining whether the rule has been violated.

Specifically, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) defines “discrimination” to include “communication that a lawyer knows or reasonably should know manifests an intention: to treat a person as inferior based on one or more of the characteristics listed in this paragraph; to disregard relevant considerations of individual characteristics or merit because of one or more of the listed characteristics . . . .” On its face, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) targets both conduct and communication or speech. Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s chilling effect on lawyers’ speech could not be more explicit and is profoundly disturbing.

The definition lacks meaningful substance and fails to give lawyers fair notice of what “communication” will violate Proposed Rule 8.4(h). What does “manifests an intention” mean? What does it take to “manifest[] an intention[] to treat a person as inferior based on” sex, ethnicity, or mental disability? Does belonging to Mensa “manifest an intention” to treat others differently based on mental disability? Does belonging to feminist organizations “manifest[] an intention” to treat men as inferior? Does it depend on the ideology of the specific feminist group? Does belonging to a group that celebrates one’s ethnicity “manifest an intention” to treat persons of other ethnicities as inferior? Does laughing (or smiling) at a joke qualify as “manifest[ing] an intention” to treat others as inferior? Does refusing to raise one’s arm in a show of solidarity for a particular movement “manifest an intention” to discriminate?

And what does it mean “to disregard relevant considerations of individual characteristics or merit”? Who determines what considerations are “relevant”? Who defines what is meant by “individual . . . merit”? What qualifies as “disregard[ing]”? Whatever the answers to these questions, one thing is certain: “Initiatives aimed at recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees” are discrimination for purposes of Proposed Rule 8.4(h). If a male applicant and a female applicant are both well-qualified, but the male applicant went to a more prestigious law school and has had better summer work experiences, the hiring partner risks discipline if he hires the female applicant. See infra at pp. 35-37.

E. Despite a nod to speech concerns, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) will chill speech and cause lawyers to self-censor in order to avoid any disciplinary issue.

Proposed Rule 8.4(h) is aimed at lawyers’ conduct, which Proposed Comments [8] and [9] define as “conduct or communication.” Proposed Rule 8.4(h) will chill lawyers’ speech, religious exercise, and association because risk-averse lawyers will self-censor rather than risk crossing a disciplinary line, particularly if that line is ill-defined. It is not good for the profession, or for a robust civil society, for lawyers to be potentially subject to disciplinary action every time
they speak or write on a topic that may cause someone who disagrees to file a disciplinary complaint to silence them.

Proposed Rule 8.4(h) itself recognizes its potential for silencing lawyers and includes a sentence that reads in part: “This paragraph . . . does [not] infringe on any constitutional right of a lawyer, including advocacy on matters of public policy, the exercise of religion, or a lawyer’s right to advocate for a client.” But this provides no substantive protection; it merely asserts that the rule does not do what it in fact does. The wording is not “shall not infringe on any constitutional right of a lawyer” or “may not be interpreted to infringe on any constitutional right of a lawyer.” It’s just an unsupported assertion.

But even if “shall not” or “may not be interpreted to” language were inserted, the provision would not protect a lawyer from complaints being filed based on her speech. Nor would it protect a lawyer from an investigation of whether her speech “manifests an intention” “to disregard relevant considerations of individual characteristics or merit because of one or more of the listed characteristics.” And what will the result of the Disciplinary Bar’s investigation be? As this letter discusses, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) would violate attorneys’ constitutional rights. See infra at pp. 23-29. But proponents of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) have a much dimmer view of the scope of attorneys’ free speech rights and disagree as to the line between protected and unprotected speech. Litigation in free speech cases can last for years at great personal expense and emotional cost to the person whose speech has been suppressed.

Rather than risk a lengthy investigation with an uncertain outcome, and possibly even lengthier litigation, a rational, risk-adverse lawyer will self-censor. A lawyer’s loss of his or her license to practice law is a staggering penalty, so the end result is entirely predictable: Proposed Rule 8.4(h) will stifle attorneys’ free exchange of ideas.

It is not enough for the government to promise to be careful in its enforcement of a rule that citizens fear will suppress their speech. As the Supreme Court has observed, “The First Amendment protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige. We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.”38 Instead the Court has rejected “[t]he Government’s assurance that it will apply [a statute] far more restrictively than its language provides” because such an assurance “is pertinent only as an implicit acknowledgment of the potential constitutional problems with a more natural reading.”39

In the landmark case, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button,40 involving regulation of attorneys’ speech, the Supreme Court ruled that “a State may

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39 Id. (emphasis added).
not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights,” explaining:

If there is an internal tension between proscription and protection in the statute, we cannot assume that, in its subsequent enforcement, ambiguities will be resolved in favor of adequate protection of First Amendment rights. Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms. 41

F. Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s language regarding lawyers’ freedom to accept, decline, or withdraw from representation is unclear.

In addressing representation issues, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) substitutes the phrase “consistent with other Rules” for ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s phrase “in accordance with Rule 1.16.” It is unclear whether this solves the problem created by ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s reference to Rule 1.16 because it is not clear what “consistent with other Rules” means in the context of a lawyer’s ability “to accept, decline, or withdraw from representation.” See infra at pp. 37-39. If the intent of Proposed Rule 8.4(h) is to ensure that lawyers are completely free to accept, decline, or withdraw from representation, then the phrase “consistent with other Rules” needs to be deleted.

G. Like ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), Proposed Rule 8.4(h) uses a negligence standard.

Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s potential for chilling Hawai‘i attorneys’ speech is compounded by its use of a negligence standard rather than a knowledge requirement. The lack of a knowledge requirement is a serious flaw: “[T]he proposed rule would subject an attorney to professional discipline for uttering a statement that was not actually known to be or intended as harassing or discriminatory, simply because someone might construe it that way.” 42 Furthermore, as Dean McGinniss notes, “this relaxed mens rea standard” might be used to “more explicitly draw lawyers’ speech reflecting unconscious, or ‘implicit,’ bias within the reach of the rule.” 43 See infra at pp. 22-23.

41 Id. at 438-39.
43 McGinniss, supra note 1, at 205 & n.135.
H. Like ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), Proposed Rule 8.4(h) will burden the Office of Disciplinary Counsel with an increased number of discrimination and harassment claims, including, but not limited to, the employment context.

Concerns have been expressed by some state bar disciplinary counsel as to whether their offices have adequate financial and staff resources for adjudicating complex harassment and discrimination claims, particularly of employment discrimination claims. See infra at pp. 39-40. Increased demand may drain the limited resources of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel as the Disciplinary Board would serve as the tribunal of first resort for an increased number of discrimination and harassment claims against lawyers and law firms.

Additionally, serious questions arise about the evidentiary or preclusive effects that a state bar proceeding might have on other tribunals’ proceedings. State bar tribunals have their own rules of procedure and evidence that may be significantly different from state and federal court rules. Often, discovery is more limited in bar proceedings than in civil court. And, of course, there is no right to a jury trial in state bar proceedings.

An attorney may be disciplined regardless of whether her conduct is a violation of any other law. A lawyer’s loss of his or her license to practice law is a staggering penalty and demands a stringent process, one in which the standards for enforcement are clear and respectful of the attorneys’ rights. Proposed Rule 8.4(h) does not provide the clear enforcement standards that are necessary when the loss of one’s livelihood is at stake.

III. Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions Demonstrate the Likely Unconstitutionality of Rules Derived from ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), such as Proposed Rule 8.4(h).

Since the ABA adopted Model Rule 8.4(g), the United States Supreme Court has issued three free speech decisions that make clear that Model Rule 8.4(g) unconstitutionally chills attorneys’ speech: Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019); National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); and Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). The Becerra decision clarified that the First Amendment protects “professional speech” just as fully as other speech. That is, there is no free speech carve-out that allows content-based restrictions on professional speech. The Matal and Iancu decisions affirm that the terms used in Proposed Rule 8.4(h) create viewpoint discrimination, which is also unconstitutional.

A. NIFLA v. Becerra protects lawyers’ speech from content-based restrictions.

Under the Court’s analysis in Becerra, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on lawyers’ speech. The Court held that government restrictions on professionals’ speech – including lawyers’ professional speech – are generally subject to strict scrutiny because they are content-based speech restrictions and, therefore, presumptively unconstitutional. That is, a government regulation that targets speech must survive strict scrutiny
– a close examination of whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.

The Court explained that “[c]ontent-based regulations ‘target speech based on its communicative content.’” 44 “[S]uch laws ‘are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.’” 45 As the Court observed, “[t]his stringent standard reflects the fundamental principle that governments have ‘“no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’” 46

The Court firmly rejected the idea that professional speech is less protected by the First Amendment than other speech. This is, of course, the operative assumption underlying ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and rules derived from it.

The Court noted three recent federal courts of appeals that had ruled that “‘professional speech’ [w]as a separate category of speech that is subject to different rules” and, therefore, less protected by the First Amendment. 47 The Court then abrogated those decisions, stressing that “this Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech. Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals.’” 48 The Court rejected the idea that “professional speech” was an exception “from the rule that content-based regulations of speech are subject to strict scrutiny.” 49

Instead, the Court was clear that a State’s regulation of attorney speech would be subject to strict scrutiny to ensure that any regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. The Court reaffirmed that its “precedents have long protected the First Amendment rights of professionals” and “has applied strict scrutiny to content-based laws that regulate the noncommercial speech of lawyers.” 50

45 Id.
47 Id. at 2371.
48 Id. at 2371-72 (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 2371.
50 Id. at 2374.
B. ABA Formal Opinion 493 and Professor Aviel’s article fail to address the Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA v. Becerra.

1. ABA Formal Opinion 493 fails even to mention Becerra.

The ABA Section of Litigation recognized Becerra’s impact in a recently published article. Several section members understood that the decision raised grave concerns about the overall constitutionality of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g):

Model Rule 8.4(g) “is intended to combat discrimination and harassment and to ensure equal treatment under the law,” notes Cassandra Burke Robertson, Cleveland, OH, chair of the Appellate Litigation Subcommittee of the Section’s Civil Rights Litigation Committee. While it serves important goals, “the biggest question about Rule 8.4(g) has been whether it unconstitutionally infringes on lawyers’ speech rights—and after the Court’s decision in Becerra, it increasingly looks like the answer is yes,” Robertson concludes. 51

But on July 15, 2020, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 493, “Model Rule 8.4(g): Purpose, Scope, and Application.” The troubling document serves to underscore the breadth of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and the fact that it is intended to restrict lawyers’ speech. 52 The opinion reassures that it will only be used for “harmful” conduct, which the rule makes clear includes “verbal conduct” or “speech.” 53 This is troubling because, in recent years, many have urged a greatly expanded definition of what constitutes “harmful” speech, even as many have questioned the value of free speech generally.

Formal Opinion 493 explains that the Rule’s scope “is not restricted to conduct that is severe or pervasive.” 54 Violations will “often be intentional and typically targeted at a particular individual or group of individuals.” This merely confirms that a lawyer can be disciplined for

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53 Id. at 1.
54 Id. (emphasis added).
speech that is not necessarily intended to harm and that does not “target” a particular person or group.55

Formal Opinion 493 claims that “[t]he Rule does not prevent a lawyer from freely expressing opinions and ideas on matters of public concern.” But that is hardly reassuring because “matters of public concern” is a term of art in free speech jurisprudence that appears in the context of the broad limits that the government is allowed to place on its employees’ free speech. The category actually provides less protection for free speech rather than more protection.56 And it may even reflect the notion that lawyers’ speech is akin to government speech, a topic that Professor Aviel briefly mentions in her article.57 If lawyers’ speech is treated as if it were the government’s speech, then lawyers have minimal protection for their speech.

Formal Opinion 493 claims that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) does not “limit a lawyer’s speech or conduct in settings unrelated to the practice of law,” but fails to grapple with just how broadly the Rule defines “conduct related to the practice of law,” for example, to include social settings.58 In so doing, Formal Opinion 493 ignores the Court’s instruction in Becerra that lawyers’ professional speech – not just their speech “unrelated to the practice of law” – is protected by the First Amendment under a strict scrutiny standard.

Perhaps most bewildering is the fact that Formal Opinion 493 does not even mention the Supreme Court’s Becerra decision, even though the Becerra decision was handed down two years ago and has been frequently relied upon to show ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s constitutional deficiencies. This lack of mention, let alone analysis, of Becerra is inexplicable. Formal Opinion 493 has a four-page section that discusses “Rule 8.4(g) and the First Amendment,” yet never mentions the United States Supreme Court’s recent, on-point decisions in Becerra, Matal, and Iancu. Like the proverbial ostrich burying its head in the sand, the ABA adamantly refuses to see the deep flaws of Model Rule 8.4(g).59 A state’s highest court does not have that luxury.

Formal Opinion 493 concedes that its definition of the term “harassment” is not the same as the EEOC uses,60 citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., which ruled that “[c]onduct that is

55 Id.
56 Garcetti v. Cabellos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (“the First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern”); id. at 418 (“To be sure, conducting these inquiries sometimes has proved difficult.”)
57 Rebecca Aviel, Rule 8.4(g) and the First Amendment: Distinguishing Between Discrimination and Free Speech, 31 Geo. J. L. Ethics 31, 34 (2018) (“[L]awyers have such an intimate relationship with the rule of law that they are not purely private speakers. Their speech can be limited along lines analogous with government actors because, in a sense, they embody and defend the law itself”). The mere suggestion that lawyers’ speech is akin to government actors’ speech, which is essentially government speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment, is deeply troubling and should be soundly rejected.
59 Id. at 9-12.
60 Id. at 4 & n.13.
not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment – an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive – is beyond Title VII’s purview.”61 The ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s definition of “harassment” in Comment [3] includes “derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical conduct.” Of course, this definition runs headlong into the Supreme Court’s ruling that the mere act of government officials determining whether speech is “disparaging” is viewpoint discrimination that violates freedom of speech. In Formal Opinion 493, the ABA offers a new definition for “harassment” (“aggressively invasive, pressuring, or intimidating”) that is not found in ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). Formal Opinion 493 signifies that the ABA recognizes that the term “harassment” is the Rule’s Achilles’ heel.

2. The Aviel article fails to mention Becerra and, therefore, is not a reliable source of information on the constitutionality of Proposed Rule 8.4(h).

Professor Rebecca Aviel’s article, Rule 8.4(g) and the First Amendment: Distinguishing Between Discrimination and Free Speech, 31 Geo. J. L. Ethics 31 (2018), should not be relied upon in assessing Proposed Rules 8.4(h)’s chilling effect on lawyers’ freedom of speech because it makes no mention of the Supreme Court’s decision in Becerra. It seems probable that the article was written before the Supreme Court issued its Becerra opinion and, for that reason, is not helpful in assessing the constitutionality of a rule that involves lawyers’ speech.

Of critical importance, Professor Aviel’s article rests on the assumption that “regulation of the legal profession is legitimately regarded as a ‘carve-out’ from the general marketplace” that “appropriately empowers bar regulators to restrict the speech of judges and lawyers in a manner that would not be permissible regulation of the citizenry in the general marketplace.”62 But this is precisely the assumption that the Supreme Court rejected in Becerra. Contradicting Professor Aviel’s assumption, the Court explained in Becerra that the First Amendment does not contain a carve-out for “professional speech.”63 Instead, the Court actually used lawyers’ speech as an example of protected speech.

Interestingly, even without the Becerra decision to guide her, Professor Aviel conceded that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) with its comments’ “expansiveness may well raise First Amendment overbreadth concerns.”64 But because she wrote without benefit of Becerra and relied on basic assumptions repudiated by the Court in Becerra, her free speech analysis cannot be viewed as correct or authoritative.

61 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)
62 Aviel, supra note 57, at 39 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 44.
63 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.
64 Aviel, supra note 57, at 48.

Under the Court’s analysis in *Matal*, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is an unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction on lawyers’ speech. In *Matal*, a unanimous Court held that a federal statute was facially unconstitutional because it allowed government officials to penalize “disparaging” speech. The Court made clear that a government prohibition on disparaging, derogatory, demeaning, or offensive speech is blatant viewpoint discrimination and, therefore, unconstitutional.\(^{65}\)

All justices agreed that a provision of a longstanding federal law, the Lanham Act, was unconstitutional because it allowed government officials to deny trademarks for terms that may “disparage or bring into contempt or disrepute” living or dead persons. Allowing government officials to determine what words do and do not “disparage” a person “offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”\(^{66}\) Justice Alito, writing for a plurality of the Court, noted that “[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”\(^{67}\)

In his concurrence, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice Kennedy stressed that “[t]he danger of viewpoint discrimination is that the government is attempting to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader debate,” particularly “if the ideas or perspectives are ones a particular audience might think offensive.”\(^{68}\) Justice Kennedy closed with a sober warning:

A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some portion of the public can be turned against minority and dissenting views to the detriment of all. The First Amendment does not entrust that power to the government’s benevolence. Instead, our reliance must be on the substantial safeguards of free and open discussion in a democratic society.\(^{69}\)

Justice Kennedy explained that the federal statute was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because the government permitted “a positive or benign mark but not a derogatory one,” which “reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds

\(^{65}\) 137 S. Ct. at 1753-1754, 1765; *see also* id. at 1766 (unconstitutional to suppress speech that “demeans or offends”) (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by JJ. Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan).

\(^{66}\) Id. at 1751 (quotation marks and ellipses omitted).

\(^{67}\) Id. at 1764 (plurality op.), quoting *United States v. Schwimmer*, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

\(^{68}\) Id. at 1767.

\(^{69}\) Id. at 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
offensive,” which is “the essence of viewpoint discrimination.”70 And it was viewpoint
discriminatory even if it “applies in equal measure to any trademark that demeans or offends.”71

In 2019, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its rigorous prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination. The challenged terms in Iancu were “immoral” and “slanderous” and, once
again, the Court found the terms were viewpoint discriminatory because they allowed
government officials to pick and choose which speech to allow.

In her opinion for the Court, Justice Kagan explained that “immoral” and “scandalous”
insert a “facial viewpoint bias in the law [that] results in viewpoint-discriminatory application.”72
The Lanham Act, was unconstitutional because:

[I]t allows registration of marks when their messages accord with,
but not when their messages defy, society’s sense of decency or
propriety. Put the pair of overlapping terms together and the
statute, on its face, distinguishes between two opposed sets of
ideas: those aligned with conventional moral standards and those
hostile to them; those inducing societal nods of approval and those
provoking offense and condemnation. The statute favors the
former, and disfavors the latter.73

D. Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s terms “harassment” and “discrimination”
are viewpoint discriminatory.

If a longstanding federal law, such as the Lanham Act, cannot withstand viewpoint-
discrimination analysis, it seems even less likely that Proposed Rule 8.4(h) can withstand
viewpoint-discrimination analysis under the Matal and Iancu analyses. The definition of
“harassment” found in proposed Comment [8] states:

“Harassment” on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, physical or mental disability, age, sexual orientation,
gender identity and/or gender expression as used in this section
means derogatory, offensive, obnoxious, or demeaning conduct or
communication and includes, but is not limited to unwelcome
sexual advances, or other conduct or communication unwelcome
due to its implicit or explicit sexual content, or any conduct
defined in HRS § 604-10.5 and HRS § 711-1106.

70 Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71 Id.
73 Id.
But, as we have seen in *Matal*, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a federal statute was facially unconstitutional because it allowed government officials to penalize “disparaging” speech. The Court made clear that a government prohibition on disparaging, derogatory, demeaning, or offensive speech is blatant viewpoint discrimination and, therefore, unconstitutional.\(^{74}\)

Determining that “communication” is “offensive” or “obnoxious” is equally prohibited to government officials. Justice Kennedy in *Matal* stressed that “[t]he danger of viewpoint discrimination is that the government is attempting to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader debate,” particularly “if the ideas or perspectives are ones a particular audience might think offensive.”\(^{75}\) And in the same opinion, Justice Alito reiterated that “[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”\(^{76}\)

Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s definition of “discrimination” in Comment [9] fares no better. It states:

> “Discrimination” on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, physical or mental disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity and/or gender expression as used in this section means conduct or *communication* that a lawyer knows or reasonably should know *manifests an intention*: to treat a person as inferior based on one of more of the characteristics listed in this paragraph; to *disregard relevant considerations of individual characteristics or merit because of one or more of the listed characteristics*; or to cause or attempt to cause interference with the fair administration of justice based on one or more of the listed characteristics.

Like the definition of “harassment,” the definition of “discrimination” is also unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because of its use of vague terms. Here are some of the problems with the definition:

- What does it mean for a lawyer “to disregard relevant considerations of individual characteristics or merit because of one or more of the listed characteristics”?
- How will disciplinary counsel determine which considerations of individual characteristics or merit are “relevant,” and which are not?

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\(^{74}\) 137 S. Ct. at 1753-1754, 1765; *see also*, id. at 1766 (unconstitutional to suppress speech that “demeans or offends”) (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by JJ. Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan).

\(^{75}\) *Id.* at 1767.

\(^{76}\) *Id.* at 1764 (plurality op.), quoting *United States v. Schwimmer*, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
• This requirement means that a law firm must hire a male who is slightly more qualified (e.g., went to a slightly more prestigious law school) over a female who is nearly, but not quite, as well qualified. This would be true for other diversity hires, including race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation.

• It would seem that a lawyer could be disciplined for unknowingly “manifest[ing] an intention” to “disregard relevant considerations of individual characteristics or merit because of one or more of the listed characteristics.” The definition’s nebulosity really does not give lawyers fair warning of what conduct will subject them to discipline.

Proposed Rule 8.4(h) itself recognizes its potential for silencing lawyers and includes a sentence that reads in part: “This paragraph . . . does [not] infringe on any constitutional right of a lawyer, including advocacy on matters of public policy, the exercise of religion, or a lawyer’s right to advocate for a client.” But this provides no substantive protection; it merely asserts that the rule does not do what it in fact does. See supra at pp. 11-13.

Besides creating unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, the vagueness in the terms “harassment” and “discrimination” as used by Proposed Rule 8.4(h) necessarily will chill lawyers’ speech. Compounding the unconstitutionality, the terms fail to give lawyers fair notice of what speech might subject them to discipline. Proposed Rule 8.4(h) does not provide the clear enforcement standards that are necessary when the loss of one’s livelihood is at stake.

E. Proposed Rule 8.4(h) does not preclude a finding of professional misconduct based on a lawyer’s “implicit bias.”

Proposed Rule 8.4(h) is particularly perilous because the list of words and conduct deemed “discrimination” or “harassment” is ever shifting in often unanticipated ways. Unfortunately, with its negligence standard, it is entirely foreseeable that Proposed Rule 8.4(h) could reach communication or conduct demonstrating “implicit bias.”

77 Nothing in Proposed Rule 8.4(h) prevents punishing a lawyer for communication based on implicit bias if someone thinks the lawyer “reasonably should have known” the communication was discriminatory.

The proponents of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) frequently emphasize their concerns about implicit bias, which is discriminatory conduct that the lawyer is not consciously aware is

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77 At its mid-year meeting in February 2018, the ABA adopted Resolution 302, a model policy that “urges . . . all employers in the legal profession, to adopt and enforce policies and procedures that prohibit, prevent, and promptly redress harassment and retaliation based on sex, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, and the intersectionality of sex with race and/or ethnicity.” ABA Res. 302 (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/mym2018res/302.pdf.
discriminatory. On its webpages devoted to its “Implicit Bias Initiative,” the ABA defines “implicit bias” and “explicit biases” as follows:

**Explicit biases:** Biases that are directly expressed or publicly stated or demonstrated, often measured by self-reporting, e.g., “I believe homosexuality is wrong.” A preference (positive or negative) for a group based on stereotype.

**Implicit bias:** A preference (positive or negative) for a group based on a stereotype or attitude we hold that operates outside of human awareness and can be understood as a lens through which a person views the world that automatically filters how a person takes in and acts in regard to information. Implicit biases are usually measured indirectly, often using reaction times.

One can agree that implicit bias exists and still believe that bias “outside of human awareness” should not be grounds for a lawyer’s loss of licensure or her suspension, censure, or admonition. Certainly nothing would prevent a charge of discrimination based on “implicit bias” from being brought against an attorney. Such charges are foreseeable given that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s “proponents repeatedly invoked that concept [of implicit bias] in arguing against any knowledge qualifier at all.”

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78 See Halaby & Long, supra note 24, at 216-217, 243-245. Halaby & Long eventually conclude that implicit-bias conduct probably would not fall within the “reasonably should know” standard. Id. at 244-245. We are not so certain.


80 Halaby & Long, supra note 24, at 245 (“Even crediting the existence of implicit bias as well as corresponding concerns over its impact on the administration of justice, one recoils at the dystopian prospect of punishing a lawyer over unconscious behavior.”). See also, McGinnis, supra note 1, at 204-205; Dent, supra note 22, at 144.

81 See, e.g., Irene Oritseweyinni Joe, Regulating Implicit Bias in the Federal Criminal Process, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 965, 975 (2020) (ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) “addresses explicit attorney bias, but I argue that it also provides a vehicle for those tasked with governing attorney behavior to address implicit bias.”); id. at 978n.70 (“[T]he rule’s use of ‘knows or reasonably should know’ arguably includes an understanding and reflection of unconscious bias and its effects.”).

82 Halaby & Long, supra note 24, at 244 (“When a new anti-bias rule proved unsaleable without a knowledge qualifier, one was added, but only with the alternative ‘reasonably should know’ qualifier alongside. That addition was not subjected to comment by the public or by the bar or the ABA’s broader membership.”)(footnote omitted).

A. Proposed Rule 8.4(h) would regulate lawyers’ interactions with anyone while engaged in conduct related to the practice of law.

Proposed Rule 8.4(h) would make professional misconduct any “conduct while acting in a professional capacity that the lawyer knew or reasonably should have known is harassment or discrimination” on twelve separate bases (“race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, physical or mental disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, gender identity and/or gender expression”) whenever a lawyer is: “representing clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers or others while engaged in the practice of law; or operating or managing a law firm or law practice.” Note that “acting in a professional capacity” includes but is not limited to representing clients, interacting with others while engaged in the practice of law, or managing a law firm. In other words, it can include any conduct or communication by a lawyer while acting in a professional capacity.

Simply put, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) would regulate a lawyer’s “conduct . . . while . . . interacting with . . . others while engaged in the practice of law.” The compelling question becomes: What conduct does Proposed Rule 8.4(h) not reach? Virtually everything a lawyer does can be characterized as conduct while interacting with others while engaged in the practice of law.83 Even much of a lawyer’s social life can be viewed as business development and opportunities to cultivate relationships with current clients or gain exposure to new clients.

Proponents of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) candidly observed that they sought a new black letter rule precisely because they wanted to regulate nonlitigating lawyers, such as “[a]cademics, nonprofit lawyers, and some government lawyers,” as well as “[t]ax lawyers, real estate lawyers, intellectual property lawyers, lobbyists, academics, corporate lawyers, and other lawyers who practice law outside the court system.”84

As accompanying Comments [8] and [9] to Proposed Rule 8.4(h) make clear in their definitions of “harassment” and “discrimination,” Proposed Rule 8.4(h) includes “conduct or communication.” In other words, it regulates pure speech.

83 See Halaby & Long, supra note 24, at 226 (“The proposed comment of Version 3 [of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)] expanded the ambit of ‘conduct related to the practice of law’ to include virtually anything a working lawyer might do.”)
This is highly problematic for lawyers who are frequently asked to speak to community groups, classes, and other audiences about current legal issues of the day. Lawyers frequently participate in panel discussions regarding sensitive social and political issues. Their commentary is sought by the media regarding controversial issues in their community, state, and nation. Of course, lawyers are asked to speak because they are lawyers. And a lawyer’s speaking engagements often have a dual purpose of increasing the lawyer’s visibility and creating new business opportunities.

Proposed Rule 8.4(h) raises numerous questions about whether various routine expressive activities could expose a lawyer to potential disciplinary action,\(^8^5\) including:

- Is a lawyer subject to discipline for her discussion of hypotheticals while presenting a CLE course?\(^8^6\)
- Is a lawyer subject to discipline when participating in legal panel discussions that touch on controversial political, religious, and social viewpoints?\(^8^7\)
- Is a law professor or adjunct faculty member subject to discipline for a law review article or a class discussion that explores controversial topics or expresses unpopular viewpoints?
- Must lawyers abstain from writing blogposts or op-eds because they risk a bar complaint by an offended reader?
- Must lawyers forgo media interviews on topics about which they have some particularly insightful comments because anyone hearing the interview could file a complaint?\(^8^8\)
- Can a lawyer lose his license to practice law for a tweet calling a female public official a derogatory sexist term?\(^8^9\)

\(^{8^5}\) For another thought-provoking list of possible issues, see Blackman, supra note 23 at 246.

\(^{8^6}\) See, e.g., Kathryn Rubino, Did D.C. Bar Course Tell Attorneys That It’s Totally Cool to Discriminate If that’s What the Client Wants?, Above the Law (Dec. 12, 2018) (reporting on attendees’ complaints regarding an instructor’s discussion of a hypothetical about sex discrimination and the applicability of the ethical rules during the mandatory D.C. Bar Professional Ethics course for newly admitted D.C. attorneys), https://abetthelaw.com/2018/12/did-d-c-bar-course-tell-attorneys-its-totally-cool-to-discriminate-if-thats-what-the-client-wants/.

\(^{8^7}\) Eugene Volokh, Professor Stephen Gillers (NYU) Unwittingly Demonstrates Why ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) Chills Protected Speech, The Volokh Conspiracy, June 17, 2019, https://reason.com/2019/06/17/professor-stephen-gillers-nyu-unwittingly-demonstrates-why-aba-model-rule-8-4g-chills-protected-speech/. The article explains that in a media interview regarding ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), a proponent of the Rule (wrongly) stereotyped opponents of the Rule by race and gender, and suggests that the same comment made in the context of a bar association debate might be grounds for discipline under ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).


\(^{8^9}\) Debra Cassens Weiss, BigLaw Partner Deletes Twitter Account after Profane Insult Toward Sarah Huckabee Sanders, ABA Journal, Oct. 1, 2018 (lawyer, honored in 2009 by the ABA Journal “for his innovative use of social media in his practice,” apologized to firm colleagues, saying no “woman should be subjected to such animus”),
• Is a lawyer subject to discipline for employment decisions made by religious or other charitable nonprofits if she sits on its board and ratifies its decisions or employment policies?90

• May a lawyer participate in a panel discussion only if all the lawyers on the panel speak in favor of the inclusion of various groups as protected classes in a nondiscrimination law being debated in the state legislature?

• Is a lawyer at risk if she provides legislative testimony in favor of adding new protected classes to state or local civil rights laws, but only if religious exemptions (which some regard as “a license to discriminate”) are also added?91

• Is a lawyer subject to discipline for comment letters she writes as a lawyer expressing her personal views on proposed Title IX regulations, immigration issues, census questions, re-districting proposals, or capital gains tax proposals?

• Is a lawyer subject to discipline for refusing to use “preferred” pronouns that she believes are not objectively accurate?92

• Is a lawyer subject to discipline for serving on the board of an organization that discriminates based on sex, such as a social fraternity or sorority?

• Is a lawyer at risk for volunteer legal work for political candidates who take controversial positions?

• Is a lawyer at risk for any pro bono work that involves advocating for or against controversial socioeconomic, religious, social, or political positions?93

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90 See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics, Opinion 222 (1991) (punting the issue of whether a lawyer could be disciplined for arguably discriminatory employment decisions made by his church or a religious nonprofit while he was on its board), https://www.dcbbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion222.cfm.

91 The Montana Legislature passed a resolution expressing its concerns about the impact of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) on “the speech of legislative staff and legislative witnesses, who are licensed by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana to practice law, when they are working on legislative matters or testifying about legislation before Legislative Committees.” See infra notes 138 & 139.

92 Meriwether v. Shawnee State University, 2020 WL 704615 (S.D. Ohio 2020), on appeal, No. 20-3289 (6th Cir., Mar. 16, 2020) (tenured professor disciplined by university for violating its nondiscrimination policies because he refused to address a transgender student using the student’s preferred gender identity title and pronouns).

93 Whether adoption of the American Bar Association’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) would constitute violation of an attorney’s statutory or constitutional rights (RQ-0128-KP), Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0123 (Dec. 20, 2016) at 3, https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/op/2016/kp0123.pdf. (“Given the broad nature of this rule, a court could apply it to an attorney’s participation in a continuing education panel discussion, authoring a law review article, or informal conversations at a bar association event.”); ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) and LSBA proposed Rule 8.4(g) violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, 17 La. Att’y Gen. Op. 0114 (Sept. 8, 2017) at 4, https://lalegalethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2017-09-08-LA-AG-Opinion-17-0114-re-Proposed-Rule-8.4f.pdf?x16384, at 6 (“[A] lawyer who is asked his opinions, thoughts, or impressions on legal matters taking place in the news at a social function could also be found to be engaged in conduct related to the practice of law.”).
Professor Eugene Volokh has explored whether discipline under ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) could be triggered by conversation on a wide range of topics at a local bar dinner, explaining:

Or say that you’re at a lawyer social activity, such as a local bar dinner, and say that you get into a discussion with people around the table about such matters — Islam, evangelical Christianity, black-on-black crime, illegal immigration, differences between the sexes, same-sex marriage, restrictions on the use of bathrooms, the alleged misdeeds of the 1 percent, the cultural causes of poverty in many households, and so on. One of the people is offended and files a bar complaint.

Again, you’ve engaged in “verbal ... conduct” that the bar may see as “manifest[ing] bias or prejudice” and thus as “harmful.” This was at a “social activ[ity] in connection with the practice of law.” The state bar, if it adopts this rule, might thus discipline you for your “harassment.”

Sadly, we live at a time when many people, including lawyers, are willing to suppress the free speech of those with whom they disagree. Indeed, a troubling situation arose in 2018, in Alaska, when the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission (AERC) filed a complaint against an Anchorage law firm, alleging that the firm violated a municipal nondiscrimination law. The firm represented a religiously-affiliated, private nonprofit shelter for homeless women, many of whom had been abused by men. The firm represented the shelter in a proceeding arising from a discrimination complaint filed with the AERC, alleging that the shelter had refused admission to a biological male who identified as female. The shelter denied the complaint, explaining that it had denied shelter to the individual because, among other things, of its policy against admitting persons who were inebriated, but acknowledging that it had a policy against admitting biological men. The law firm responded to an unsolicited request for a media interview. When the interview was published providing the shelter’s version of the facts, the AERC brought a discrimination claim against the law firm alleging it had published a discriminatory policy. The AERC complaint was eventually dismissed, but only after several months of legal proceedings.

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95 See, e.g., Aaron Haviland, “I Thought I Could Be a Christian and Constitutionalist at Yale Law School. I Was Wrong,” The Federalist (Mar. 4, 2019), http://thefederalist.com/2019/03/04/thought-christian-constitutionalist-yale-law-school-wrong/ (student president of Yale Law School chapter of the Federalist Society describing significant harassment by other Yale Law students and student organizations because they did not like the ideas that they ascribed (accurately or inaccurately) to Federalist Society members and guest speakers).

Because lawyers frequently are the spokespersons and leaders in political, social, religious, or cultural movements, a rule that can be employed to discipline a lawyer for his or her speech on controversial issues should be rejected because it constitutes a serious threat to a civil society in which freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, and freedom of political belief flourish. In a time when respect for First Amendment rights seems to diminish by the day, lawyers can ill-afford to wager their licenses on a rule that may be utilized to punish their speech.

At bottom, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) has a “fundamental defect” because it “wrongly assumes that the only attorney speech that is entitled to First Amendment protection is purely private speech that is entirely unrelated to the practice of law. But the First Amendment provides robust protection to attorney speech.” 97 ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and Proposed Rule 8.4(h) create doubt as to whether particular speech is permissible and, therefore, will inevitably chill lawyers’ public speech. 98 In all likelihood, it will chill speech on one side of current political and social issues, while simultaneously creating little disincentive for lawyers who speak on the opposing side of these controversies. 99 If so, public discourse, civil society, and clients will suffer from the ideological straitjacket that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and its progeny will impose on lawyers.

B. Attorneys could be subject to discipline for guidance they offer when serving on the boards of their congregations, religious schools and colleges, or other nonprofit charities.

Many lawyers sit on the boards of their congregations, religious schools and colleges, and other religious nonprofit organizations. These organizations provide incalculable good to people in their local communities, as well as nationally and internationally. These organizations also face innumerable legal questions and regularly turn to the lawyers serving as volunteers on their boards for pro bono guidance.100

As a volunteer on a charitable institution’s board, a lawyer arguably is “acting in a professional capacity” when providing legal expertise to a board discussion about the

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97 Tenn. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 42, at 7 (“[T]he goal of the proposed rule is to subject to regulatory scrutiny all attorney expression that is in any way connected with the practice of law. That approach is wholly inconsistent with the First Amendment.”) (Emphasis in original.)
98 Id. at 8 (“Even if the [Board of Professional Responsibility] may ultimately decide not to impose disciplinary sanctions on the basis of such speech, or a court may ultimately invalidate on First Amendment grounds any sanction imposed, the fact that the rule on its face would apply to speech of that nature would undoubtedly chill attorneys from engaging in speech in the first place.”).
99 McGinniss, supra note 1, at 217-249 (explaining the “justified distrust of speech restrictions” such as Model Rule 8.4(g), in light of its proponents’ stated desire “for a cultural shift . . . to be captured in the rules of professional conduct”).
100 Whether adoption of the American Bar Association’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) would constitute violation of an attorney’s statutory or constitutional rights (RQ-0128-KP), Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0123 (Dec. 20, 2016) at 4 (“Model Rule 8.4(g) could also be applied to restrict an attorney’s religious liberty and prohibit an attorney from zealously representing faith-based groups.”), https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/op/2016/kp0123.pdf.
institution’s policies. For example, a lawyer may be asked to help craft her congregation’s policy regarding whether its clergy will perform marriages or whether the institution’s facilities may be used for wedding receptions that are contrary to its religious beliefs. A religious college may ask a lawyer who serves on its board of trustees to review its housing policy or its student code of conduct. Drafting and reviewing legal policies may qualify as conduct while “acting in a professional capacity,” but surely a lawyer should not fear being disciplined for volunteer legal work that she performs for her church or her alma mater. By making Hawai‘i Bar members hesitant to serve on their boards, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) would do real harm to religious and charitable institutions and hinder their good works in their communities.

C. Attorneys’ membership in religious, social, or political organizations could be subject to discipline.

Proposed Rule 8.4(h) could chill lawyers’ willingness to associate with political, cultural, or religious organizations that promote traditional values regarding sexual conduct and marriage. Would Proposed Rule 8.4(h) subject lawyers to disciplinary action for participating with their children in youth organizations that teach traditional values regarding sexual conduct or marriage? Would lawyers be subject to disciplinary action for belonging to political organizations that advocate for laws that promote traditional values regarding sexual conduct and marriage?

The late Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski expressed concern that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) would subject lawyers to discipline for attending events sponsored by the St. Thomas More Society, an organization of Catholic lawyers and judges who meet together to share their faith. State attorneys general have voiced similar concerns. Several attorneys general have warned that “serving as a member of the board of a religious organization, participating in groups such as Christian Legal Society or even speaking about how one’s

101 See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics, Opinion 222, supra note 90. See also, Tenn. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 42, at 8 n.8 (“statements made by an attorney in his or her capacity as a member of the board of a nonprofit or religious organization” “could be deemed sufficiently ‘related to the practice of law’ to fall within the scope of Proposed Rule 8.4(g)”).
103 Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 18, in “§ 8.4-2(j)-2. The New Rule 8.4 and the Free Speech Problems It May Raise.”
104 Tex. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 100, at 5 (“Many attorneys belong to faith-based legal organizations, such as a Christian Legal Society, a Jewish Legal Society, or a Muslim Legal Society, but Model Rule 8.4(g) could curtail such participation for fear of discipline.”); ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) and LSBA proposed Rule 8.4(g) violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, 17 La. Att’y Gen. Op. 0114 (Sept. 8, 2017) at 6 (“Proposed 8.4(h) could apply to many of the faith-based legal societies such as the Christian Legal Society, Jewish Legal Society, and Muslim Legal Society.”), https://lalegeethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2017-09-08-LA-AG-Opinion-17-0114-re-Proposed-Rule-8.4f.pdf?x16384.
religion influences one’s work as an attorney” could “be deemed conduct ‘related to the practice of law.'”

D. Proposed Rule 8.4(h)’s potential for chilling Hawai‘i attorneys’ speech is compounded by its use of a negligence standard rather than a knowledge requirement.

The lack of a knowledge requirement is a serious flaw: “[T]he proposed rule would subject an attorney to professional discipline for uttering a statement that was not actually known to be or intended as harassing or discriminatory, simply because someone might construe it that way.” As Professor Dane Ciolino, an ethics law professor at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, has explained:

[ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)] subjects to discipline not only a lawyer who knowing engages in harassment or discrimination, but also a lawyer who negligently utters a derogatory or demeaning comment. So, a lawyer who did not know that a comment was offensive will be disciplined if the lawyer should have known that it was. It will be interesting to see how the ‘objectively reasonable lawyer’ will be constructed for purposes of making this determination.

“As Dean McGinniss notes, “this relaxed mens rea standard” might even be used to “more explicitly draw lawyers’ speech reflecting unconscious, or ‘implicit,’ bias within the reach of the rule.”

V. The ABA’s Original Claim that 24 States have a Rule Similar to ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is not Accurate Because only Vermont and New Mexico have Fully Adopted ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).

When the ABA adopted Model Rule 8.4(g) in 2016, it claimed that “as has already been shown in the jurisdictions that have such a rule, it will not impose an undue burden on

106 Id. at 5. See Halaby & Long, supra note 24, at 243-245.
108 Id. at 5.
109 McGinniss, supra note 1, at 205 & n.135.
lawyers.”110 But this claim has been shown to be factually incorrect. As the 2019 edition of the Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct states: “Over half of all jurisdictions have a specific rule addressing bias and/or harassment – all of which differ in some way from the Model Rule [8.4(g)] and from each other.”111

No empirical evidence, therefore, supports the claim that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) will not impose an undue burden on lawyers. As even its proponents have conceded, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) does not replicate any black letter rule adopted by a state supreme court before 2016. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia had adopted some version of a black letter rule dealing with “bias” issues before the ABA promulgated Model Rule 8.4(g) in 2016; however, each of these black letter rules was narrower than ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).112 Thirteen states had adopted a comment rather than a black letter rule to deal with bias issues. Fourteen states had adopted neither a black letter rule nor a comment.

A proponent of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), Professor Stephen Gillers, wrote that “[a]lthough courts in twenty-five American jurisdictions (twenty-four states and Washington, D.C.) have adopted anti-bias rules in some form, these rules differ widely.”113 He then highlighted the primary differences between these pre-2016 rules and ABA Model Rule 8.4(g):

Most contain the nexus “in the course of representing a client” or its equivalent. Most tie the forbidden conduct to a lawyer’s work in connection with the “administration of justice” or, more specifically, to a matter before a tribunal. Six jurisdictions’ rules require that forbidden conduct be done “knowingly,” “intentionally,” or “willfully.” Four jurisdictions limit the scope of their rules to conduct that violates federal or state anti-discrimination laws and three of these require that a complainant first seek a remedy elsewhere instead of discipline if one is

113 Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A Guide for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 195, 208 (2017) (footnotes omitted). Professor Gillers notes that his spouse “was a member of the [ABA] Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, the sponsor of the amendment [of ABA Model Rule 8.4].” Id. at 197 n.2.
available. Only four jurisdictions use the word “harass” or variations in their rules.¹¹₄

VI. Official Entities in Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas Have Rejected ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), While Official Entities in Louisiana, Minnesota, and Nevada Have Abandoned Efforts to Impose it on Their Attorneys.

Federalism’s great advantage is that one state can reap the benefit of other states’ experience. Prudence counsels waiting to see whether states (besides Vermont and New Mexico) adopt ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), and then observing the effects of its real-life implementation on attorneys in those states. This is particularly true when ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) has failed to survive close scrutiny by official entities in many states.¹¹⁵

A. Several State Supreme Courts have rejected ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).

The Supreme Courts of Arizona, Idaho, New Hampshire, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee have officially rejected adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). In August 2018, after a public comment period, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected a petition from the Central Arizona Chapter of the National Lawyer Guild urging adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).¹¹⁶ In September 2018, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a resolution by the Idaho State Bar Association to adopt a modified version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).¹¹⁷ In April 2018, after a public comment period, the Supreme Court of Tennessee denied a petition to adopt a slightly modified version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).¹¹⁸ The petition had been filed by the Tennessee Bar Association and the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility. The Tennessee Attorney General filed a comment letter, explaining that a black letter rule based on ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) “would violate the constitutional rights of Tennessee attorneys and conflict with the existing Rules of Professional Conduct.”¹¹⁹ In June 2017, the Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).¹²⁰ The Court acted after the state bar’s House of

¹¹⁴ Id. at 208.
¹¹⁵ McGinniss, supra note 1, at 213-217.
¹¹⁷ Idaho Supreme Court, Letter to Executive Director, Idaho State Bar (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.celsreligiousfreedom.org/sites/default/files/site_files/ISC%20Letter%20-%208.4PC%208.4(g).pdf.
¹²⁰ The Supreme Court of South Carolina, Re: Proposed Amendments to Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct Appellate Case No. 2017-000498, Order (June 20, 2017), http://www.sccourts.org/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2017-06-20-01 (if arrive at South Carolina Judicial Department homepage, select “2017” as year and then scroll down to “2017-06-20-01”).
Delegates, as well as the state attorney general, recommended against its adoption. In July 2019, the New Hampshire Supreme Court “decline[d] to adopt the rule proposed by the Advisory Committee on Rules.” In March 2020, the Supreme Court of South Dakota unanimously decided to deny the proposed amendment to Rule 8.4 because the court was “not convinced that proposed Rule 8.4(g) is necessary or remedies an identified problem.”

In May 2019, the Maine Supreme Court announced that it had adopted a modified version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The Maine rule is significantly narrower than the ABA Model Rule in several ways. First, the Maine rule’s definition of “discrimination” differs from the ABA Model Rule’s definition of “discrimination.” Second, its definition of “conduct related to the practice of law” also differs. Third, it covers fewer protected categories. Despite these modifications, when challenged, the Maine rule will likely be found unconstitutional because it overtly targets protected speech. See supra at pp. 13-15.

In June 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, over one justice’s dissent, adopted a greatly modified version to take effect December 8, 2020. The novel new rule is not limited to specific protected classes, but instead seems to prohibit any “words or conduct” that “knowingly manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment or discrimination” against anyone. Furthermore, the terms “bias,” “prejudice,” harassment,” and discrimination” are defined by “applicable federal, state, or local statutes or ordinances,” which seems to mean that words and conduct that are professional misconduct for a lawyer in Pittsburgh may not be for a lawyer in Lancaster.

In September 2017, the Supreme Court of Nevada granted the request of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Nevada to withdraw its petition urging adoption of Model Rule

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122 Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Order (July 15, 2019), https://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/orders/7-15-19-order.pdf. The court instead adopted a rule amendment that had been proposed by the Attorney Discipline Office and unique to New Hampshire.
125 See The State of New Hampshire Supreme Court of New Hampshire Order 1, July 15, 2019, (“As of this writing, only one state, Vermont, has adopted a rule that is nearly identical to the model rule. Maine has adopted a rule that is similar, but is not nearly identical, to Model Rule 8.4(g).”), https://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/orders/7-15-19-order.pdf.
8.4(g). In a letter to the Court, the State Bar President explained that “the language used in other jurisdictions was inconsistent and changing,” and, therefore, “the Board of Governors determined it prudent to retract [the Petition] with reservation to refile [it] when, and if the language in the rule sorts out in other jurisdictions.”

B. State Attorneys General have identified core constitutional issues with ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).

In December 2016, the Texas Attorney General issued an opinion opposing ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The Texas Attorney General stated that “if the State were to adopt Model Rule 8.4(g), its provisions raise serious concerns about the constitutionality of the restrictions it would place on members of the State Bar and the resulting harm to the clients they represent.” The Attorney General declared that “[c]ontrary to . . . basic free speech principles, Model Rule 8.4(g) would severely restrict attorneys’ ability to engage in meaningful debate on a range of important social and political issues.”

Agreeing with the Texas Attorney General’s assessment of the unconstitutionality of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), the Attorney General of South Carolina determined that “a court could well conclude that the Rule infringes upon Free Speech rights, intrudes upon freedom of association, infringes upon the right to Free Exercise of Religion and is void for vagueness.”

In September 2017, the Louisiana Attorney General concluded that “[t]he regulation contained in ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is a content-based regulation and is presumptively invalid.” Because of the “expansive definition of `conduct related to the practice of law’” and its “countless implications for a lawyer’s personal life,” the Attorney General found the Rule to be “unconstitutionally overbroad as it prohibits and chills a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech and conduct.”

In March 2018, the Attorney General of Tennessee filed Opinion 18-11, American Bar Association’s New Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(g), attaching his office’s comment letter to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, opposing adoption of a proposed rule closely

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129 Id.
132 Id. at 6.
modeled on ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The Attorney General concluded that the proposed rule “would violate the constitutional rights of Tennessee attorneys and conflict with the existing Rules of Professional Conduct.”

In May 2018, the Arizona Attorney General filed a comment letter urging the Arizona Supreme Court to heed the opposition of other states, state attorneys general, and state bar associations to adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). He also noted the constitutional concerns that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) raises as to free speech, association, and expressive association.

In August 2019, the Alaska Attorney General provided a letter to the Alaska Bar Association during a public comment period that it held on adoption of a rule modeled on ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The letter identified numerous constitutional concerns with the proposed rule. The Bar Association’s Rules of Professional Conduct recommended that the Board not advance the proposed rule to the Alaska Supreme Court but instead remand it to the committee for additional revisions after “[t]he amount of comments was unprecedented.” A second public comment period closed August 10, 2020.

C. The Montana Legislature recognized the problems that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) poses for legislators, witnesses, staff, and citizens.

On April 12, 2017, the Montana Legislature adopted a joint resolution expressing its view that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) would unconstitutionally infringe on the constitutional rights of Montana citizens, and urging the Montana Supreme Court not to adopt ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The impact of Model Rule 8.4(g) on “the speech of legislative staff and legislative witnesses, who are licensed by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana to practice law, when

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they are working on legislative matters or testifying about legislation before Legislative Committees” greatly concerned the legislature.  

D. Several state bar associations have rejected ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).

On December 10, 2016, the Illinois State Bar Association Assembly “voted overwhelmingly to oppose adoption of the rule in Illinois.” On September 15, 2017, the North Dakota Joint Committee on Attorney Standards voted not to recommend adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), expressing concerns that it was “overbroad, vague, and imposes viewpoint discrimination” and that it might “have a chilling effect on free discourse by lawyers with respect to controversial topics or unpopular views.” On October 30, 2017, the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Committee, which had spent a year studying a proposal to adopt a version of Model Rule 8.4(g), voted “not to recommend the proposed amendment to Rule 8.4 to either the House of Delegates or to the Supreme Court.”

VII. Proposed Rule 8.4(h) Could make it Professional Misconduct for Attorneys to Engage in Hiring Practices that Favor Persons Because they are Women or Belong to Racial, Ethnic, or Sexual Minorities.

A highly regarded professional ethics expert, Thomas Spahn, has explained that “ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s flat prohibition covers any discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or any of the other listed attributes” and “extends to any lawyer conduct ‘related to the practice of law,’ including ‘operating or managing a law firm or law practice.’” In written materials for a CLE presentation, Mr. Spahn concluded that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) “thus prohibits such discrimination as women-only bar groups or networking events, minority-only recruitment days or mentoring sessions, etc.”

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139 Id. at 3. The Tennessee Attorney General similarly warned that “[e]ven statements made by an attorney as a political candidate or a member of the General Assembly could be deemed sufficiently ‘related to the practice of law’ to fall within the scope of Proposed Rule 8.4(g).” Tenn. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 42, at 8 n.8.


143 The District of Columbia Bar, Continuing Legal Education Program, Civil Rights and Diversity: Ethics Issues 5-6 (July 12, 2018) (quoting Comment [4] to ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)). The written materials used in the program are on file with Christian Legal Society and may be purchased from the D.C. Bar CLE program.

144 Id. at 6.
He further concluded that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) would prohibit any discrimination in hiring practices:\(^{145}\)

\[L\]awyers will also have to comply with the new per se discrimination ban in their personal hiring decisions. Many of us operating under the old ABA Model Rules Comments or similar provisions either explicitly or sub silentio treated race, sex, or other listed attributes as a “plus” when deciding whom to interview, hire, or promote within a law firm or law department. That is discrimination. It may be well-intentioned and designed to curry favor with clients who monitor and measure law firms’ head count on the basis of such attributes – but it is nevertheless discrimination. In every state that adopts the new ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), it will become an ethics violation.

Mr. Spahn dismissed the idea that Comment [4] of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), which Proposed Rule 8.4(h) does not have, would allow these efforts to promote certain kinds of diversity to continue. Even though Comment [4] states that “[l]awyers may engage in conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion . . . by . . . implementing initiatives aimed at recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees or sponsoring diverse law student organizations,” as the ethics expert explained, “[t]his sentence appears to weaken the blanket anti-discrimination language in the black letter rule, but on a moment’s reflection it does not – and could not – do that.”\(^{146}\) He provided three reasons for his conclusion that efforts to promote certain kinds of diversity would violate the rule and, therefore, would need to cease.\(^{147}\)

As discussed supra at pp. 35-37, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) would also make it a disciplinable matter for lawyers to participate in such diversity programs. As has been noted, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) does not even include the futile attempt to exempt such programs that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) has.

\(^{145}\) Id. at 7 (emphasis supplied).

\(^{146}\) Id. at 5. See also, id. at 5-6 (“Perhaps that sentence was meant to equate ‘diversity’ with discrimination on the basis of race, sex, etc. But that would be futile – because it would fly in the face of the explicit authoritative prohibition in the black letter rule. It would also be remarkably cynical, by forbidding discrimination in plain language while attempting to surreptitiously allow it by using a code word.”)

\(^{147}\) Those three reasons are: 1) the language in comments is only guidance and not binding; 2) the drafters of the rule “clearly knew how to include exceptions to the binding black letter anti-discrimination rule” because two exceptions actually are contained in the black letter rule itself, so “[i]f the ABA wanted to identify certain discriminatory conduct permitted by the black letter rule, it would have included a third exception in the black letter rule;” and 3) the comment “says nothing about discrimination” and “does not describe activities permitting discrimination on the basis of the listed attributes.” The references could be to “political viewpoint diversity, geographic diversity, and law school diversity” which “would not involve discrimination prohibited in the black letter rule.”
The potential consequences for firms’ efforts to promote diversity provide yet another reason to allow other jurisdictions to experiment with ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) in order to see its unintended consequences on diversity initiatives in those jurisdictions before adopting it in Hawai‘i.

VIII. Proposed Rule 8.4(g) Could Limit Hawai‘i Lawyers’ Ability to Accept, Decline, or Withdraw from a Representation.

The proponents of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) generally claim that it will not affect a lawyer’s ability to refuse to represent a client. They point to the language in the rule that it “does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline, or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.” But in the one state to have adopted ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), the Vermont Supreme Court explained in its accompanying Comment [4] that “[t]he optional grounds for withdrawal set out in Rule 1.16(b) must also be understood in light of Rule 8.4(g). They cannot be based on discriminatory or harassing intent without violating that rule.” The Vermont Supreme Court further explained that, under the mandatory withdrawal provision of Rule 1.16(a), “a lawyer should withdraw if she or he concludes that she or he cannot avoid violating Rule 8.4(g).” ¹⁴⁸

As Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski explained, Rule 1.16 actually “deals with when a lawyer must or may reject a client or withdraw from representation.”¹⁴⁹ Rule 1.16 does not address accepting clients.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, as Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski have observed, Comment [5] to ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) would seem to limit any right to decline representation, if permitted at all, to “limiting the scope or subject matter of the lawyer’s practice or by limiting the lawyer’s practice to members of underserved populations.”¹⁵¹

Dean McGinniss agrees that “[d]espite its ostensible nod of non-limitation, Model Rule 8.4(g) offers lawyers no actual protection against charges of ‘discrimination’ based on their discretionary decision to decline representation of clients, including ones whose objectives are fundamentally disagreeable to the lawyer.”¹⁵² Because Model Rule 1.16 “addresses only when lawyers must decline representation, or when they may or must withdraw from representation” but not when they “are permitted to decline client representation,” Model Rule 8.4(g) seems only to allow what was already required, not declinations that are discretionary. Dean McGinniss

¹⁴⁹ Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 18, in “§ 8.4-2(j)-2. The New Rule 8.4 and the Free Speech Problems It May Raise” (emphasis supplied by the authors).
¹⁵⁰ A state attorney general concurs that “[a]n attorney who would prefer not to represent a client because the attorney disagrees with the position the client is advocating, but is not required under Rule 1.16 to decline the representation, may be accused of discriminating against the client under Proposed Rule 8.4(g).” Tenn. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 42, at 11.
¹⁵¹ See Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 18.
¹⁵² McGinniss, supra note 1, at 207-209.
warns that “if state bar authorities consider a lawyer’s declining representation . . . as ‘manifest[ing] bias or prejudice,’ they may choose to prosecute the lawyer for violating their codified Model Rule 8.4(g).”\textsuperscript{153}

The New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics issued an opinion in January 2017 that concluded that “[a] lawyer is under no obligation to accept every person who may wish to become a client unless the refusal to accept a person amounts to unlawful discrimination.”\textsuperscript{154} The facts before the Committee were that a lawyer had been requested to represent a claimant against a religious institution. Because the lawyer was of the same religion as the institution, he or she was unwilling to represent the claimant against the institution. Calling the definition of “unlawful discrimination” for purposes of New York’s Rule 8.4(g) a question of law beyond its jurisdiction, the Committee declined to “opine on whether a lawyer’s refusal to represent a prospective client in a suit against the lawyer’s own religious institution constitutes ‘unlawful discrimination’” for purposes of New York’s Rule 8.4(g).\textsuperscript{155}

In Stropnicky v. Nathanson,\textsuperscript{156} the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination found a law firm that specialized in representing women in divorce cases had violated state nondiscrimination law when it refused to represent a man.\textsuperscript{157} As these examples demonstrate, reasonable doubt exists that Rule 1.16 provides adequate protection for attorneys’ ability to accept, decline, or withdraw from a representation.

In addressing representation issues, Proposed Rule 8.4(h) substituted the phrase “consistent with other Rules” for ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s phrase “in accordance with Rule 1.16.” It is unclear whether this solves the problem because it is not clear what “consistent with other Rules” means in the context of a lawyer’s ability “to accept, decline, or withdraw from representation.” If the intent of Proposed Rule 8.4(h) is to ensure that lawyers are completely free to accept, decline, or withdraw from representation if it is adopted, then the phrase “consistent with other Rules” needs to be deleted.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Id.} at 207-208 & n.146, citing Stephen Gillers, \textit{supra} note 113, at 231-32, as, in Dean McGinniss’ words, “conceding that the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ concerns about religious lawyers’ loss of freedom in client selection under Model Rule 8.4(g) are well founded, though not a basis for objecting to the rule.”


\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Id.} New York’s Rule 8.4(g) was adopted before ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and is narrower.


\textsuperscript{157} Rotunda & Dzienkowski, \textit{supra} note 18, in “§ 8.4-2(j)-2. The New Rule 8.4 and the Free Speech Problems It May Raise.”
IX. Does the Office of Disciplinary Counsel have Adequate Resources to Process an Increased Number of Discrimination and Harassment Claims, Including Employment Discrimination Claims?

Concerns have been expressed by some state bar disciplinary counsel as to whether bar disciplinary offices have adequate financial and staff resources for adjudicating complex harassment and discrimination claims, particularly employment discrimination claims. For example, the Montana Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) voiced concerns about the breadth of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The ODC quoted from a February 23, 2016, email from the National Organization of Bar Counsel (“NOBC”) to its members explaining that the NOBC Board had declined to take a position on then-proposed ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) because “there were a number of simple regulatory issues, not the least of which is the possibility of diverting already strained resources to investigate and prosecute these matters.”

The Montana ODC thought that “any unhappy litigant” could claim that opposing counsel had discriminated on the basis of “one or more of the types of discrimination named in the rule.” The ODC also observed that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) did not require “that a claim be first brought before an appropriate regulatory agency that deals with discrimination.” In that regard, the ODC recommended that the court consider “Illinois’ rule [that] makes certain types of discrimination unethical and subject to discipline” because it required that “the lawyer disciplinary process cannot be initiated until there is a finding to that effect by a court or administrative agency” and required that “the conduct must reflect adversely on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.”

Proposed Rule 8.4(h) generates several new concerns. Increased demand may also drain the resources of the Attorney Disciplinary Board as it serves as the tribunal of first resort for an increased number of discrimination and harassment claims against lawyers and law firms. Serious questions arise about the evidentiary or preclusive effects that a state bar proceeding might have on other tribunals’ proceedings. State bar tribunals have their own rules of procedure and evidence that may be significantly different from state and federal court rules. Often, discovery is more limited in bar proceedings than in civil court. And, of course, there is no right to a jury trial in state bar proceedings.

Moreover, an attorney may be disciplined regardless of whether her conduct is a violation of any other law. Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski warn that Rule 8.4(g) “may

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159 Id. at 3-4.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 3.
162 Id. at 5.
discipline the lawyer who does not violate any statute or regulation [except Rule 8.4(g)] dealing with discrimination.”\textsuperscript{163} Nor is “an allegedly injured party [required] to first invoke the civil legal system” before a lawyer can be charged with discrimination or harassment.\textsuperscript{164}

The threat of a complaint under Proposed Rule 8.4(h) could also be used as leverage in other civil disputes between a lawyer and a former client. Proposed Rule 8.4(h) even may be the basis of an implied private right of action against an attorney. Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski note this risk:

If lawyers do not follow this proposed Rule, they risk discipline (e.g., disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law). In addition, Courts enforce the Rules in the course of litigation (e.g., sanctions, disqualification). Courts also routinely imply private rights of action from violation of the Rules – malpractice and tort suits by third parties (non-clients).\textsuperscript{165}

Unsurprisingly, Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski disagree with the rule’s proponents that lawyers “should rely on prosecutorial discretion because disciplinary boards do not have the resources to prosecute every violation.” They warn that “[d]iscretion, however, may lead to abuse of discretion, with disciplinary authorities going after lawyers who espouse unpopular ideas.”\textsuperscript{166}

A lawyer’s loss of his or her license to practice law is a staggering penalty and demands a stringent process, one in which the standards for enforcement are clear and respectful of the attorneys’ rights, as well as the rights of others. Proposed Rule 8.4(h) does not provide the clear enforcement standards that are necessary when the loss of one’s livelihood is at stake.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Because Proposed Rule 8.4(h) will drastically chill lawyers’ freedom to express their viewpoints on political, social, religious, and cultural issues, and for the additional reasons given in this letter, it should be rejected. For the same reasons, Proposed New Section 15 to the Guidelines of Professional Courtesy and Civility should also be rejected.

At a minimum, the Court should wait to see whether the widespread prediction that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) will operate as a speech code for attorneys is borne out if and when it is adopted in several other states. There is no reason to make Hawai‘i attorneys the laboratory subjects in the ill-conceived experiment that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) represents. A decision to

\textsuperscript{163} Rotunda & Dzienkowski, \textit{supra} note 18 (parenthetical in original).
\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Id.}
reject Proposed Rule 8.4(h) can always be revisited, but the damage its premature adoption may do to Hawai‘i attorneys cannot be undone.

Christian Legal Society thanks the Court for holding this public comment period and considering its comments.

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