August 10, 2019

Chief Justice Mark S. Cady
Justice David Wiggins
Justice Brent R. Appel
Justice Thomas D. Waterman
Justice Edward M. Mansfield
Justice Susan Christensen
Justice Christopher McDonald
Iowa Supreme Court
1111 East Court Avenue
Des Moines, Iowa 50319
By email: rules.comments@iowacourts.gov

RE: Chapter 32 Amendments:
Comment Letter Opposing Proposed Amendment Rule 32:8.4(g),
page 33, lines 44-46; page 34, lines 1-46; page 35, line 1

Dear Chief Justice Cady, Justice Wiggins, Justice Appel, Justice Waterman, Justice Mansfield,
Justice Christensen, and Justice McDonald:

This comment letter is filed pursuant to the Court’s Order of August 1, 2019, seeking public comment on several proposed rules. This letter opposes adoption of the proposed amendment to Rule 32:8.4(g) and its accompanying comments (page 33, lines 44-46; page 34, lines 1-46; and page 35, line 1).

Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) would add the highly criticized, deeply flawed ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) to the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. For the reasons discussed below, Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) should be rejected and the current Rule 32:8.4(g) retained without amendment. Current Rule 32:8.4(g) already makes it professional misconduct to “engage in sexual harassment or other unlawful discrimination in the practice of law.” Current Comment [3] accompanying current Rule 32:8.4(d) further prohibits certain manifestations of “bias or prejudice” based upon eight protected classes. The existing rule and comment already provide adequate protections without raising the serious problems created by the exceptionally broad ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).

After three years of deliberations by state supreme courts and state bar associations in many states across the country, Vermont is the only state to have adopted ABA Model Rule

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8.4(g). In contrast, at least eleven states have concluded, after careful study, that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is both unconstitutional and unworkable. These states have opted to take the prudent course of letting other states experiment with ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) in order to evaluate its actual effect on the lawyers in those states.

This letter addresses several problems with ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and, therefore, with Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g), including:

1. Scholars’ criticism of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) as a speech code for lawyers (pp. 2-5);
2. Its unconstitutionality under the analyses in two recent United States Supreme Court decisions (pp. 5-7);
3. Its overreach into attorneys’ lives, particularly its chilling effect on their speech and religious exercise, which is exacerbated by its use of a negligence rather than knowledge standard (pp. 7-14);
4. The fact that only Vermont has adopted ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), contrary to a common, but inaccurate, claim that 24 states have a similar rule (pp. 14-15);
5. The fact that it is not needed because Iowa’s current Rule 32:8.4(g) makes sexual harassment and unlawful discrimination professional misconduct (p. 15-16);
6. The fact that official bodies in Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas have rejected ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), and Louisiana, Minnesota, and Nevada have abandoned proposals to adopt it (pp. 16-20);
7. Its likely unintended consequence of making it professional misconduct for law firms to engage in hiring practices intended to achieve certain diversity goals in law firms (pp. 20-22);
8. Its ramifications for lawyers’ ability to accept, decline, or withdraw from a representation (pp. 22-23); and
9. Whether the Attorney Disciplinary Board has adequate resources to meet the potential increase in employment and other discrimination and harassment claims against attorneys and firms (pp. 23-25).

I. Scholars have explained that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is a speech code for lawyers.

A number of scholars have accurately characterized ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) as a speech code for lawyers. For example, Professor Eugene Volokh of UCLA School of Law, a nationally recognized First Amendment expert, has summarized his view that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is a speech code that will have a serious impact on attorneys’ speech in a two-minute video for the Federalist Society.  

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The late Professor Ronald Rotunda, a highly respected scholar in both constitutional law and legal ethics, warned that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) threatens lawyers' First Amendment rights.\(^4\) Regarding the new rule, he and Professor John S. Dzienkowski wrote, in the 2017-2018 edition of *Legal Ethics: The Lawyer's Deskbook on Professional Responsibility*, “[t]he ABA’s efforts are well intentioned, but . . . raise problems of vagueness, overbreadth, and chilling protected speech under the First Amendment.”\(^5\) They observed that “[t]he language the ABA has adopted in Rule 8.4(g) and its associated Comments are similar to laws that the Supreme Court has invalidated on free speech grounds.”\(^6\)

Writing about the problem ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) poses for lawyers’ speech in a *Wall Street Journal* commentary entitled *The ABA Overrules the First Amendment*, Professor Rotunda explained:

> In the case of rule 8.4(g), the standard, for lawyers at least, apparently does not include the First Amendment right to free speech. Consider the following form of “verbal” conduct when one lawyer tells another, in connection with a case, “I abhor the idle rich. We should raise capital gains taxes.” The lawyer has just violated the ABA rule by manifesting bias based on socioeconomic status.\(^7\)

Professor Rotunda further developed his critique in a memorandum for the Heritage Foundation entitled *The ABA Decision to Control What Lawyers Say: Supporting ‘Diversity’ But Not Diversity of Thought*.\(^8\)

Dean of the University of North Dakota School of Law Michael S. McGinniss, who teaches professional responsibility, recently “examine[d] multiple aspects of the ongoing Model Rule 8.4(g) controversy, including the rule’s background and deficiencies, states’ reception (and widespread rejection) of it, [and] socially conservative lawyers’ justified distrust of new speech


\(^6\) *Id.* at “§ 8.4-2(j)-2. The New Rule 8.4 and the Free Speech Problems It May Raise.”


\(^8\) Rotunda, *supra* note 4.
restrictions.” Professor Josh Blackman has explained that “Rule 8.4(g) is unprecedented, as it extends a disciplinary committee’s jurisdiction to conduct merely ‘related to the practice of law,’ with only the most tenuous connection to representation of clients, a lawyer’s fitness, or the administration of justice.”

In a thoughtful examination of the rule’s legislative history, practitioners Andrew Halaby and Brianna Long conclude that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) “is riddled with unanswered questions, including but not limited to uncertainties as to the meaning of key terms, how it interplays with other provisions of the Model Rules, and what disciplinary sanctions should apply to a violation; as well as due process and First Amendment free expression infirmities.” They recommend that “jurisdictions asked to adopt it should think long and hard about whether such a rule can be enforced, constitutionally or at all.” And they conclude that “the new model rule cannot be considered a serious suggestion of a workable rule of professional conduct to which real world lawyers may be fairly subjected.”

In adopting its new model rule, the ABA largely ignored over 480 comment letters, most opposed to the new rule. Even the ABA’s own Standing Committee on Professional Discipline filed a comment letter questioning whether there was a demonstrated need for the rule and raising concerns about its enforceability, although the Committee dropped its opposition immediately prior to the House of Delegates’ vote.

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11 Andrew F. Halaby & Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g): Legislative History, Enforceability Questions, and a Call for Scholarship, 41 J. Legal. Prof. 201, 257 (2017).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 204.
15 Halaby & Long, supra note 11, at 220 & n.97 (listing the Committee’s concerns as including: lack of empirical evidence of need for Rule; vagueness of key terms; enforceability; constitutionality; coverage of employment discrimination complaints; mens rea requirement; and potential limitation on ability to decline representation), citing Letter from Ronald R. Rosenfeld, Chair ABA Standing Committee On Professional Responsibility, to Myles Lynk, Chair ABA Standing Committee On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Mar. 10, 2016, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_model_rule%208_4_comments/20160310%20Rosenfeld-Lynk%20SCPD%20Proposed%20MABA MODEL RULE%208-4%20g%20Comments%20FINAL%20Protected.authcheckdam.pdf.
A recurrent concern in many of the comments was the threat that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) poses to attorneys’ First Amendment rights. But little was done to address these concerns. In their thoughtful explication of the legislative history of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), Halaby and Long conclude that “the new model rule’s afflictions derive in part from indifference on the part of rule change proponents, and in part from the hasty manner in which the rule change proposal was pushed through to passage.” Specifically, the rule went through five versions, of which three versions evolved “in the two weeks before passage, none of these was subjected to review and comment by the ABA’s broader membership, the bar at large, or the public.” Halaby and Long summarized the legislative history of the rule:

Model Rule 8.4(g) and its associated comments evolved rapidly between the initial letter from the Goal III entities in July 2014, through initial circulation of Version 1 in July 2015, to final adoption of Version 5 the following August. There was solicitation of public input only on Version 2, with only one public hearing, and ultimately with no House debate at all.

These scholars’ red flags should not be ignored. ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and its clone, Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g), pose serious problems for Iowa attorneys.

II. ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is unconstitutional under the analyses of two recent Supreme Court decisions handed down since it was promulgated.

Since the ABA adopted Model Rule 8.4(g) in August 2016, the United States Supreme Court has issued two major free speech decisions that confirm its unconstitutionality, National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018), and Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). The ABA Section of Litigation recently published an article showing that several section members see the Court’s Becerra decision as raising serious concerns about the overall constitutionality of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g):

Model Rule 8.4(g) “is intended to combat discrimination and harassment and to ensure equal treatment under the law,” notes Cassandra Burke Robertson, Cleveland, OH, chair of the Appellate Litigation Subcommittee of the Section’s Civil Rights Litigation Committee. While it serves important goals, “the biggest question about Rule 8.4(g) has been whether it unconstitutionally infringes

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16 Halaby & Long, supra note 11, at 216-223 (summarizing concerns expressed at the only public hearing on an early version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), as well as the main concerns expressed in the comment letters).
17 Id. at 203.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 233.
on lawyers’ speech rights—and after the Court’s decision in
Becerra, it increasingly looks like the answer is yes,” Robertson
concludes. 20

First, under the Court’s analysis in Becerra, Model Rule 8.4(g) is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on lawyers’ speech. The Court held that state restrictions on “professional speech” are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. The Court repudiated the idea that professional speech is less protected by the First Amendment than other speech. Three federal courts of appeals had recently ruled that “‘professional speech’ [w]as a separate category of speech that is subject to different rules” and, therefore, less protected by the First Amendment. 21 In abrogating those decisions, the Court stressed that “this Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech. Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals.’” 22 The Court rejected the idea that “professional speech” was an exception “from the rule that content-based regulations of speech are subject to strict scrutiny.” 23

Second, under the Court’s analysis in Matal, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is an unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction on lawyers’ speech that cannot survive the strict scrutiny triggered by viewpoint discrimination. In Matal, all nine justices agreed that a provision of a longstanding federal law allowing government officials to deny trademarks for terms that may “disparage or bring into contempt or disrepute” living or dead persons was unconstitutional because “[i]t offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.” 24 Justice Alito, writing for a plurality of the Court, noted that “[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” 25

In his concurrence, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan, Justice Kennedy stressed that “[t]he danger of viewpoint discrimination is that the government is attempting to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader debate,” particularly “if the ideas or perspectives are ones a particular audience might think offensive.” 26 Justice Kennedy closed with a sober warning:

22 Id. at 2371-72 (emphasis added).
23 Id. at 2371.
25 Id. at 1764 (plurality op.), quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
26 Id. at 1767.
A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some portion of the public can be turned against minority and dissenting views to the detriment of all. The First Amendment does not entrust that power to the government’s benevolence. Instead, our reliance must be on the substantial safeguards of free and open discussion in a democratic society.27

Because ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) would punish lawyers’ speech on the basis of its viewpoint and content, it is unconstitutional under the analyses in Matal and Becerra.

III. Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) would greatly expand the reach of the Professional Rules of Conduct into Iowa attorneys’ lives and chill attorneys’ expression of dissenting political, social, and religious viewpoints.

A. Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) would regulate lawyers’ interactions with anyone while engaged in conduct related to the practice of law or when participating in business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.

Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) would make professional misconduct any conduct related to the practice of law that a lawyer “knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination” on eleven separate bases (“race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status”) whenever a lawyer is: “1) representing clients; 2) interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in the practice of law; 3) operating or managing a law firm or law practice; or 4) participating in bar association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.” Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) and accompanying Comment [4] (numbering inserted).

Simply put, Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) would regulate a lawyer’s “conduct . . . while . . . interacting with . . . others while engaged in the practice of law . . . or participating in . . . bar association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.” The compelling question becomes: What conduct does Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) not reach? Virtually everything a lawyer does can be characterized as “conduct . . . while . . . interacting with . . . others while engaged in the practice of law” or “participating in . . . business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.”28 Much of a lawyer’s social life can be viewed as business development and opportunities to cultivate relationships with current clients or gain exposure to new clients.

27 Id. at 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
28 See Halaby & Long, supra note 11, at 226 (“The proposed comment of Version 3 expanded the ambit of ‘conduct related to the practice of law’ to include virtually anything a working lawyer might do.”)
Proponents of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) candidly observed that they sought a new black letter rule precisely because they wanted to regulate nonlitigating lawyers, such as “[a]cademics, nonprofit lawyers, and some government lawyers,” as well as “[t]ax lawyers, real estate lawyers, intellectual property lawyers, lobbyists, academics, corporate lawyers, and other lawyers who practice law outside the court system.”29

As Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) and its accompanying Comment [3] state, “[d]iscrimination and harassment” include “harmful verbal or physical conduct.” “Verbal conduct,” of course, is a euphemism for “speech.”

This is highly problematic for lawyers who are frequently asked to speak to community groups, classes, and other audiences about current legal issues of the day. They frequently participate in panel discussions regarding sensitive social and political issues. Their commentary is sought by the media regarding controversial issues in their community, state, and nation. Of course, lawyers are asked to speak because they are lawyers. And a lawyer’s speaking engagements often have a dual purpose of increasing the lawyer’s visibility and creating new business opportunities.

Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) raises numerous questions about whether various routine expressive activities could expose a lawyer to potential disciplinary action, including:

- Is a lawyer subject to discipline for her discussion of hypotheticals while presenting a CLE course?30
- Is a lawyer subject to discipline when participating in legal panel discussions that touch on controversial political, religious, and social viewpoints? 31
- Is a law professor or adjunct faculty member subject to discipline for a law review article or a class discussion that explores controversial topics or expresses unpopular viewpoints?

31 Eugene Volokh, Professor Stephen Gillers (NYU) Unwittingly Demonstrates Why ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) Chills Protected Speech, The Volokh Conspiracy, June 17, 2019, https://reason.com/2019/06/17/professor-stephen-gillers-nyu-unwittingly-demonstrates-why-aba-model-rule-8-4g-chills-protected-speech/. The article explains that in a media interview regarding ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), a proponent of the Rule (wrongly) stereotyped opponents of the Rule by race and gender, and suggests that the same comment made in the context of a bar association debate might be grounds for discipline under ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).
Must lawyers abstain from writing blogposts or op-eds because they risk a bar complaint by an offended reader?

Must lawyers forgo media interviews on topics about which they have some particularly insightful comments because anyone hearing the interview could file a complaint?32

Can a lawyer lose his license to practice law for a tweet calling a female public official a derogatory sexist term?33

Is a lawyer subject to discipline for employment decisions made by religious or other charitable nonprofits if she sits on its board and ratifies its decisions or employment policies?34

May a lawyer participate in a panel discussion only if all the lawyers on the panel speak in favor of the inclusion of various groups as protected classes in a nondiscrimination law being debated in the state legislature?

Is a lawyer at risk if she provides legislative testimony in favor of adding new protected classes to state or local civil rights laws, but only if religious exemptions (which some consider “a license to discriminate”) are also added?35

Is a lawyer subject to discipline for comment letters she writes as a lawyer expressing her personal views on proposed Title IX regulations, immigration issues, census questions, re-districting proposals, or capital gains tax proposals?

Is a lawyer who is running for public office subject to discipline for socio-economic discrimination if she proposes that college loans be forgiven only for graduates earning below a certain income level?

Is a lawyer subject to discipline for serving on the board of an organization that discriminates based on sex, such as a social fraternity or sorority?

Is a lawyer at risk for volunteer legal work for political candidates who take controversial positions?

Is a lawyer at risk for any pro bono work that involves advocating for or against controversial socioeconomic, religious, social, or political positions?36

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34 See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics, Opinion 222 (1991) (putting the issue of whether a lawyer could be disciplined for arguably discriminatory employment decisions made by his church or a religious nonprofit while he was on its board), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/opinions/opinion222.cfm.

35 The Montana Legislature passed a resolution expressing its concerns about the impact of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) on “the speech of legislative staff and legislative witnesses, who are licensed by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana to practice law, when they are working on legislative matters or testifying about legislation before Legislative Committees.” See infra notes 78 & 79.
Professor Eugene Volokh has explored whether discipline under ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) could be triggered by conversation on a wide range of topics at a local bar dinner, explaining:

Or say that you’re at a lawyer social activity, such as a local bar dinner, and say that you get into a discussion with people around the table about such matters — Islam, evangelical Christianity, black-on-black crime, illegal immigration, differences between the sexes, same-sex marriage, restrictions on the use of bathrooms, the alleged misdeeds of the 1 percent, the cultural causes of poverty in many households, and so on. One of the people is offended and files a bar complaint.

Again, you’ve engaged in “verbal . . . conduct” that the bar may see as “manifest[ing] bias or prejudice” and thus as “harmful.” This was at a “social activit[y] in connection with the practice of law.” The state bar, if it adopts this rule, might thus discipline you for your “harassment.”

Sadly, we live at a time when many people, including lawyers, are willing to suppress the free speech of those with whom they disagree. Indeed, a troubling situation recently arose in Alaska, when the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission (AERC) filed a complaint against an Anchorage law firm alleging that the firm violated a municipal nondiscrimination law. The firm represented a religiously affiliated, private nonprofit shelter for homeless women, many of whom had been abused by men. The firm represented the shelter in a proceeding arising from a discrimination complaint filed with the AERC, alleging that the shelter had refused admission to

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36 Whether adoption of the American Bar Association’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) would constitute violation of an attorney’s statutory or constitutional rights (RQ-0128-KP), Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. KP-0123 (Dec. 20, 2016) at 3, [https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/op/2016/kp0123.pdf](https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/op/2016/kp0123.pdf). (“Given the broad nature of this rule, a court could apply it to an attorney’s participation in a continuing legal education panel discussion, authoring a law review article, or informal conversations at a bar association event.”); ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) and LSBA proposed Rule 8.4(g) violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, 17 La. Att’y Gen. Op. 0114 (Sept. 8, 2017) at 4, [https://lalegaethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2017-09-08-LA-AG-Opinion-17-0114-re-Proposed-Rule-8.4f.pdf?x16384](https://lalegaethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2017-09-08-LA-AG-Opinion-17-0114-re-Proposed-Rule-8.4f.pdf?x16384), at 6 (“[A] lawyer who is asked his opinions, thoughts, or impressions on legal matters taking place in the news at a social function could also be found to be engaged in conduct related to the practice of law.”).


a biological male who identified as female. The shelter denied the complaint, explaining that it had denied shelter to the individual because, among other things, of its policy against admitting persons who were inebriated, but acknowledging that it had a policy against admitting biological men. The law firm responded to an unsolicited request for a media interview. When the interview was published providing the shelter’s version of the facts, the AERC brought a discrimination claim against the law firm alleging it had published a discriminatory policy. The AERC complaint was eventually dismissed, but only after several months of legal proceedings. 

Because lawyers frequently are the spokespersons and leaders in political, social, religious, or cultural movements, a rule that can be employed to discipline a lawyer for his or her speech on controversial issues should be rejected because it constitutes a serious threat to a civil society in which freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, and freedom of political belief flourish. In a time when respect for First Amendment rights seems to diminish by the day, lawyers can ill-afford to wager their licenses on a rule that may be utilized to target their speech.

At bottom, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) has a “fundamental defect” because it “wrongly assumes that the only attorney speech that is entitled to First Amendment protection is purely private speech that is entirely unrelated to the practice of law. But the First Amendment provides robust protection to attorney speech.” ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) creates doubt as to whether particular speech is permissible and, therefore, will inevitably chill lawyers’ public speech. In all likelihood, it will chill speech on one side of current political and social issues, while simultaneously creating little disincentive for lawyers who speak on the opposing side of these controversies. If so, public discourse and civil society will suffer from the ideological straitjacket that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) seeks to impose on lawyers.

B. Attorneys could be subject to discipline for guidance they offer when serving on the boards of their congregations, religious schools and colleges, or other nonprofit charities.

40 Tenn. Att’y Gen. Letter, Letter from Attorney General Slatery to Supreme Court of Tennessee (Mar. 16, 2018) at 7 (hereinafter “Tenn. Att’y Gen. Letter”), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/foi/rule84g/comments-3-16-2018.pdf. The letter is incorporated into Tennessee Attorney General Opinion 18-11; however, for purposes of quoting the letter, we cite to the page numbers of the letter rather than the opinion. (“[T]he goal of the proposed rule is to subject to regulatory scrutiny all attorney expression that is in any way connected with the practice of law. That approach is wholly inconsistent with the First Amendment.”) (Emphasis in original.)
41 Id. at 8 (“Even if the [Board of Professional Responsibility] may ultimately decide not to impose disciplinary sanctions on the basis of such speech, or a court may ultimately invalidate on First Amendment grounds any sanction imposed, the fact that the rule on its face would apply to speech of that nature would undoubtedly chill attorneys from engaging in speech in the first place.”)
42 McGinniss, supra note 9, at 217-249 (explaining the “justified distrust of speech restrictions” such as Model Rule 8.4(g), in light of its proponents’ stated desire “for a cultural shift . . . to be captured in the rules of professional conduct”).
Many lawyers sit on the boards of their congregations, religious schools and colleges, and other religious nonprofit organizations. These organizations provide incalculable good to people in their local communities, as well as nationally and internationally. They also face innumerable legal questions and regularly turn to the lawyers serving as volunteers on their boards for pro bono guidance.43

As a volunteer on religious institutions’ boards, a lawyer may arguably be engaged “in conduct related to the practice of law” or “participating in [a] social activit[y] in connection with the practice of law.” Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) and its Proposed Comment [4]. For example, a lawyer may be asked to help craft her congregation’s policy regarding whether its clergy will perform marriages or whether it will host receptions for weddings that are contrary to its religious beliefs. A religious college may ask a lawyer who serves on its board of trustees to review its housing policy or its student code of conduct. Drafting and reviewing legal policies may qualify as conduct while “engaged in the practice of law,” but surely a lawyer should not fear being disciplined for volunteer legal work she performs for her church or her alma mater.44 By making Iowa Bar members hesitant to serve on their boards, Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) would do real harm to religious and charitable institutions and hinder their good works in their communities.

C. Attorneys’ membership in religious, social, or political organizations could be subject to discipline.

Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) could chill lawyers’ willingness to participate in political, cultural, or religious organizations that promote traditional values regarding sexual conduct and marriage. Would Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) subject lawyers to disciplinary action for participating with their children in youth organizations that teach traditional values regarding sexual conduct or marriage?45 Would it subject lawyers to disciplinary action for belonging to political organizations that advocate for laws that promote traditional values regarding sexual conduct and marriage?

Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski have expressed concern that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) would subject lawyers to discipline for attending events sponsored by the St. Thomas 43 Tex. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 36, at 4 (“Model Rule 8.4(g) could also be applied to restrict an attorney’s religious liberty and prohibit an attorney from zealously representing faith-based groups.”)
44 See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics, Opinion 222, supra note 34. See also, Tenn. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 40, at 8 n.8 (“statements made by an attorney in his or her capacity as a member of the board of a nonprofit or religious organization” “could be deemed sufficiently ‘related to the practice of law’ to fall within the scope of Proposed Rule 8.4(g)”).
More Society, an organization of Catholic lawyers and judges who meet together to share their faith. Attending the Red Mass, an annual mass held by the Catholic Church for lawyers, judges, law professors, and law students, could be deemed a “social activity in connection with the practice of law” that runs afoul of Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) because of the Catholic Church’s limitation of the priesthood to males, its opposition to abortion, or its teachings regarding marriage.46

State attorneys general have voiced similar concerns.47 Several attorneys general have warned that “serving as a member of the board of a religious organization, participating in groups such as the Christian Legal Society, or even speaking about how one’s religious beliefs influence one’s work as an attorney” could “be deemed conduct ‘related to the practice of law.’”48

D. Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g)’s threat to free speech is compounded by its use of a negligence standard rather than a knowledge requirement.

The lack of a knowledge requirement is a serious flaw: “[T]he proposed rule would subject an attorney to professional discipline for uttering a statement that was not actually known to be or intended as harassing or discriminatory, simply because someone might construe it that way.”49 As Professor Dane Ciolino, an ethics law professor at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, has explained:

[ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)] subjects to discipline not only a lawyer who knowingly engages in harassment or discrimination, but also a lawyer who negligently utters a derogatory or demeaning comment. So, a lawyer who did not know that a comment was offensive will be disciplined if the lawyer should have known that it was. It will be interesting to see how the ‘objectively reasonable lawyer’ will be constructed for purposes of making this determination.50

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46 Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 5, in “§ 8.4-2(j)-2. The New Rule 8.4 and the Free Speech Problems It May Raise.”
47 Tex. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 36, at 5 (“Many attorneys belong to faith-based legal organizations, such as a Christian Legal Society, a Jewish Legal Society, or a Muslim Legal Society, but Model Rule 8.4(g) could curtail such participation for fear of discipline.”); La. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 36, at 6 (“Proposed 8.4(h) could apply to many of the faith-based legal societies such as the Christian Legal Society, Jewish Legal Society, and Muslim Legal Society.”)
49 Id. at 5. See Halaby & Long, supra note 11, at 243-245.
“[T]he proposed rule would subject an attorney to professional discipline for uttering a statement that was not actually known to be or intended as harassing or discriminatory, simply because someone might construe it that way.”51

Similarly, in 2016, the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania criticized ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) because:

The Model Rule . . . subjects to discipline not only a lawyer who knowingly engages in harassment or discrimination, but also a lawyer who negligently utters a derogatory or demeaning comment. A lawyer who did not know that a comment was offensive will be disciplined if the lawyer should have known that it was.52

IV. The ABA’s original claim that twenty-four states have a rule similar to ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is not accurate because only Vermont has adopted ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) in full.

When the ABA adopted Model Rule 8.4(g) in 2016, it claimed that “as has already been shown in the jurisdictions that have such a rule, it will not impose an undue burden on lawyers.”53 But this claim has been shown to be factually incorrect. As the 2019 edition of the Annotated Rules of Professional Conduct states: “Over half of all jurisdictions have a specific rule addressing bias and/or harassment – all of which differ in some way from the Model Rule [8.4(g)] and from each other.”54

No empirical evidence, therefore, supports the claim that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) will not impose an undue burden on lawyers. As even its proponents have conceded, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) does not replicate any black letter rule adopted by a state supreme court before 2016.

51 Id. at 5.
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia had adopted some version of a black letter rule dealing with “bias” issues before the ABA promulgated Model Rule 8.4(g) in 2016; however, each of these black letter rules was narrower than ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).\(^{55}\) Thirteen states had adopted a comment rather than a black letter rule to deal with bias issues. Fourteen states had adopted neither a black letter rule nor a comment.

A proponent of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), Professor Stephen Gillers, has written that “[a]lthough courts in twenty-five American jurisdictions (twenty-four states and Washington, D.C.) have adopted anti-bias rules in some form, these rules differ widely.”\(^ {56}\) He then highlights the primary differences between them and ABA Model Rule 8.4(g):

- Most contain the nexus “in the course of representing a client” or its equivalent. Most tie the forbidden conduct to a lawyer’s work in connection with the “administration of justice” or, more specifically, to a matter before a tribunal. Six jurisdictions’ rules require that forbidden conduct be done “knowingly,” “intentionally,” or “willfully.” Four jurisdictions limit the scope of their rules to conduct that violates federal or state anti-discrimination laws and three of these require that a complainant first seek a remedy elsewhere instead of discipline if one is available. Only four jurisdictions use the word “harass” or variations in their rules.\(^ {57}\)

2. Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) is unnecessary because current Rule 32:8.4(g) and current Comment [3] that accompanies Rule 32:8.4(d) already protect against sexual harassment and unlawful discrimination.

Iowa is one of the twenty-four states that had already addressed concerns about sexual harassment as well as discrimination before the ABA adopted Model Rule 8.4(g). Iowa’s current provisions have stood the test of time. Specifically, current Rule 32:8.4(g) already makes it professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in sexual harassment or other unlawful discrimination in the practice of law or knowingly permit staff or agents subject to the lawyer’s


\(^{56}\) Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in law Practice: A Guide for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 195, 208 (2017) (footnotes omitted). Professor Gillers notes that his spouse “was a member of the [ABA] Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, the sponsor of the amendment [of ABA Model Rule 8.4].” Id. at 197 n.2.

\(^{57}\) Id. at 208.
direction and control to do so.” In addition, current Comment [3] that accompanies Rule 32:8.4(d) explains that “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” includes:

A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice.

The current Comment [3] is drawn verbatim from the former Comment [3] that accompanied ABA Model Rule 8.4(d) from 1998 until 2016 when it was displaced by the more expansive ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). Taken together the two current provisions already provide a carefully crafted balance that has worked well for Iowa attorneys, bar disciplinary officials, and the public.

V. Official entities in Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas have rejected ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), and Louisiana, Minnesota, and Nevada have abandoned efforts to impose it on their attorneys.

Federalism’s great advantage is that one state can reap the benefit of other states’ experience. Prudence counsels waiting to see whether states (besides Vermont) adopt ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), and then observing the effects of its real-life implementation on attorneys in those states. This is particularly true when ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) has failed close scrutiny by official entities in many states.58

A. Several state supreme courts have rejected ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).

The Supreme Courts of Arizona, Idaho, Tennessee, and South Carolina have officially rejected adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). In August 2018, after a public comment period, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected a petition from the Central Arizona Chapter of the National Lawyer Guild urging adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).59 In September 2018, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a resolution by the Idaho State Bar Association to adopt a modified version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).60 In April 2018, after a public comment period, the Supreme Court of Tennessee denied a petition to adopt a slightly modified version of ABA Model Rule

60 Idaho Supreme Court, Letter to Executive Director, Idaho State Bar (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.clsreligiousfreedom.org/sites/default/files/site_files/ISC%20Letter%20-%20IRPC%208.4%20g.pdf.
8.4(g). The petition had been filed by the Tennessee Bar Association and the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility. The Tennessee Attorney General filed a comment letter, explaining that a black letter rule based on ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) “would violate the constitutional rights of Tennessee attorneys and conflict with the existing Rules of Professional Conduct.”

In September 2017, the Supreme Court of Nevada granted the request of the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Nevada to withdraw its petition urging adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g). In a letter to the Court, the State Bar President explained that “the language used in other jurisdictions was inconsistent and changing,” and, therefore, “the Board of Governors determined it prudent to retract [the Petition] with reservation to refile [it] when, and if the language in the rule sorts out in other jurisdictions.”

In June 2017, the Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The Court acted after the state bar’s House of Delegates, as well as the state attorney general, recommended against its adoption.

In May 2019, the Maine Supreme Court announced that it had adopted a modified version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The Maine rule is significantly narrower than the ABA Model Rule in several ways. First, the Maine rule’s definition of “discrimination” is substantially more circumscribed than the ABA Model Rule’s definition of “discrimination.” Second, its

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65 The Supreme Court of South Carolina, Re: Proposed Amendments to Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct Appellate Case No. 2017-000498, Order (June 20, 2017), http://www.scourts.gov/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2017-06-20-01 (if arrive at South Carolina Judicial Department homepage, select “2017” as year and then scroll down to “2017-06-20-01”).
67 State of Maine Supreme Judicial Court Amendment to the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct Order, 2019 Me. Rules 05 (May 13, 2019), https://www.courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/amendments/2019_mr_05_prof_conduct.pdf. Alberto Bernabe, Maine Adopts (a Different Version of) ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)-Updated, Professional Responsibility Blog, June 17, 2019 (examining a few differences between Maine rule and ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)), http://bernahmepr.blogspot.com/2019/06/main-adopts-different-version-of-aba.html. See The State of New Hampshire Supreme Court of New Hampshire Order 1, July 15, 2019, (“As of this writing, only one state, Vermont, has adopted a rule that is nearly identical to the model rule. Maine has adopted a rule that is similar, but is not nearly identical, to Model Rule 8.4(g).”), https://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/orders/7-15-19-order.pdf.
definition of “conduct related to the practice of law” is much narrower because it does not include “participating in bar association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.” Third, it covers fewer protected categories. Despite these modifications, when challenged, the Maine rule will likely be found unconstitutional because it overtly targets protected speech. See supra pp. 5-7.

On July 15, 2019, the New Hampshire Supreme Court announced that it was adopting New Hampshire Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) but that its new rule was not ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The New Hampshire Advisory Committee on Rules had proposed adoption of a rule closely modeled on ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), but the court declined to adopt the committee’s proposed rule, stating: “In light of the nascent and ongoing discussion regarding the model rule, the court declines to adopt the rule proposed by the Advisory Committee on Rules.”68

On June 13, 2019, the ABA published a summary of the states’ consideration of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) to date. By the ABA’s own count, nine states have declined to adopt Model Rule 8.4(g): Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, South Carolina, and Tennessee. (As explained, we add North Dakota and Texas.) The ABA lists Vermont as the only state to have adopted ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).69

B. State attorneys general have identified core constitutional issues with ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).

In March 2018, the Attorney General of Tennessee filed Opinion 18-11, American Bar Association’s New Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(g), attaching his office’s comment letter to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, opposing adoption of a proposed rule closely modeled on ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).70 The Attorney General concluded that the proposed rule “would violate the constitutional rights of Tennessee attorneys and conflict with the existing Rules of Professional Conduct.”71

In December 2016, the Texas Attorney General issued an opinion opposing ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The Texas Attorney General stated that “if the State were to adopt Model Rule 8.4(g), its provisions raise serious concerns about the constitutionality of the restrictions it would

69 American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility Policy Implementation Committee, Jurisdictional Adoption of Rule 8.4(g) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (June 13, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/chart_adopt_8_4_g.pdf.
space on members of the State Bar and the resulting harm to the clients they represent.” The Attorney General declared that “[c]ontrary to . . . basic free speech principles, Model Rule 8.4(g) would severely restrict attorneys’ ability to engage in meaningful debate on a range of important social and political issues.”

In September 2017, the Louisiana Attorney General concluded that “[t]he regulation contained in ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) is a content-based regulation and is presumptively invalid.” Because of the “expansive definition of ‘conduct related to the practice of law’ and its ‘countless implications for a lawyer’s personal life,’” the Attorney General found the Rule to be “unconstitutionally overbroad as it prohibits and chills a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech and conduct.”

Agreeing with the Texas Attorney General’s assessment of the unconstitutionality of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), the Attorney General of South Carolina determined that “a court could well conclude that the Rule infringes upon Free Speech rights, intrudes upon freedom of association, infringes upon the right to Free Exercise of Religion and is void for vagueness.”

In May 2018, the Arizona Attorney General filed a comment letter urging the Arizona Supreme Court to heed the opposition of other states, state attorneys general, and state bar associations to adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). He also noted the constitutional concerns that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) raises as to free speech, association, and expressive association.

C. The Montana Legislature recognized the problems that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) poses for legislators, witnesses, staff, and citizens.

On April 12, 2017, the Montana Legislature adopted a joint resolution expressing its view that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) would unconstitutionally infringe on the constitutional rights of Montana citizens, and urging the Montana Supreme Court not to adopt ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The impact of Model Rule 8.4(g) on “the speech of legislative staff and legislative

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73 Id.
75 Id. at 6.
78 A Joint Resolution of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the State of Montana Making the Determination that it would be an Unconstitutional Act of Legislation, in Violation of the Constitution of the State of Montana, and would Violate the First Amendment Rights of the Citizens of Montana, Should the Supreme Court of
D. Several State Bar Associations Have Rejected ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).

On December 10, 2016, the Illinois State Bar Association Assembly “voted overwhelmingly to oppose adoption of the rule in Illinois.” On September 15, 2017, the North Dakota Joint Committee on Attorney Standards voted not to recommend adoption of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), expressing concerns that it was “overbroad, vague, and imposes viewpoint discrimination” and that it might “have a chilling effect on free discourse by lawyers with respect to controversial topics or unpopular views.” On October 30, 2017, the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Committee, which had spent a year studying a proposal to adopt a version of Model Rule 8.4(g), voted “not to recommend the proposed amendment to Rule 8.4 to either the House of Delegates or to the Supreme Court.” In June 2019, however, the South Dakota Bar Association voted to send to the South Dakota Supreme Court a proposal to adopt a highly modified version of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g).

VI. Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) could make it professional misconduct for attorneys to engage in hiring practices that favor persons because they are women, belong to racial, ethnic, or sexual minorities, or represent a particular socioeconomic status.

A highly regarded professional ethics expert, Thomas Spahn, has explained that “ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)’s flat prohibition covers any discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or any of the other listed attributes” and “extends to any lawyer conduct ‘related to the practice of law,’


79 Id. at 3. The Tennessee Attorney General similarly warned that “[e]ven statements made by an attorney as a political candidate or a member of the General Assembly could be deemed sufficiently ‘related to the practice of law’ to fall within the scope of Proposed Rule 8.4(g).” Tenn. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 40, at 8 n.8.


including ‘operating or managing a law firm or law practice.’”84 In written materials for a CLE presentation, Mr. Spahn concluded that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) “thus prohibits such discrimination as women-only bar groups or networking events, minority-only recruitment days or mentoring sessions, etc.”85

He further concluded that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) would prohibit any discrimination in hiring practices:86

[L]awyers will also have to comply with the new per se discrimination ban in their personal hiring decisions. Many of us operating under the old ABA Model Rules Comments or similar provisions either explicitly or sub silentio treated race, sex, or other listed attributes as a “plus” when deciding whom to interview, hire, or promote within a law firm or law department. That is discrimination. It may be well-intentioned and designed to curry favor with clients who monitor and measure law firms’ head count on the basis of such attributes – but it is nevertheless discrimination. In every state that adopts the new ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), it will become an ethics violation.

Mr. Spahn dismissed the idea that Comment [4] of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) would allow these efforts to promote certain kinds of diversity to continue. Even though Comment [4] states that “[l]awyers may engage in conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion . . . by . . . implementing initiatives aimed at recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees or sponsoring diverse law student organizations,” as the ethics expert explained, “[i]t appears to weaken the blanket anti-discrimination language in the black letter rule, but on a moment’s reflection it does not – and could not – do that.”87 He provided three reasons for his conclusion that efforts to promote certain kinds of diversity would violate the rule and, therefore, would need to cease.88

84 The District of Columbia Bar, Continuing Legal Education Program, Civil Rights and Diversity: Ethics Issues 5-6 (July 12, 2018) (quoting Comment [4] to ABA Model Rule 8.4(g)). The written materials used in the program are on file with Christian Legal Society and may be purchased from the D.C. Bar CLE program.
85 Id. at 6.
86 Id. at 7 (emphasis supplied).
87 Id. at 5. See also, id. at 5-6 (“Perhaps that sentence was meant to equate ‘diversity’ with discrimination on the basis of race, sex, etc. But that would be futile – because it would fly in the face of the explicit authoritative prohibition in the black letter rule. It would also be remarkably cynical, by forbidding discrimination in plain language while attempting to surreptitiously allow it by using a code word.”)
88 Those three reasons are: 1) the language in comments is only guidance and not binding; 2) the drafters of the rule clearly knew how to include exceptions to the binding black letter anti-discrimination rule” because two exceptions actually are contained in the black letter rule itself, so “[i]f the ABA wanted to identify certain discriminatory conduct permitted by the black letter rule, it would have included a third exception in the black letter rule;” and 3) the comment “says nothing about discrimination” and “does not describe activities permitting discrimination on the
The potential consequences for firms’ efforts to promote diversity provides yet another reason to allow other jurisdictions to experiment with ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) in order to see its unintended consequences in those jurisdictions before adopting it in Iowa.

VII. Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) could limit Iowa lawyers’ ability to accept, decline, or withdraw from a representation.

The proponents of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) generally claim that it will not affect a lawyer’s ability to refuse to represent a client. They point to the language in the rule that it “does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline, or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.” But in the one state to have adopted ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), the Vermont Supreme Court explained in its accompanying Comment [4] that “[t]he optional grounds for withdrawal set out in Rule 1.16(b) must also be understood in light of Rule 8.4(g). They cannot be based on discriminatory or harassing intent without violating that rule.” The Vermont Supreme Court further explained that, under the mandatory withdrawal provision of Rule 1.16(a), “a lawyer should withdraw if she or he concludes that she or he cannot avoid violating Rule 8.4(g).”

As Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski explained, Rule 1.16 actually “deals with when a lawyer must or may reject a client or withdraw from representation.” Rule 1.16 does not address accepting clients. Moreover, as Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski have observed, Comment [5] to ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) would seem to limit any right to decline representation, if permitted at all, to “limiting the scope or subject matter of the lawyer’s practice or by limiting the lawyer’s practice to members of underserved populations.”

Dean McGinniss, a professional responsibility professor, agrees that “[d]espite its ostensible nod of non-limitation, Model Rule 8.4(g) offers lawyers no actual protection against charges of ‘discrimination’ based on their discretionary decision to decline representation of clients, including ones whose objectives are fundamentally disagreeable to the lawyer.” Because Model Rule 1.16 “addresses only when lawyers must decline representation, or when

90 Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 5, in “§ 8.4-2(j)-2. The New Rule 8.4 and the Free Speech Problems It May Raise” (emphasis supplied by the authors).
91 A state attorney general concurs that “[a]n attorney who would prefer not to represent a client because the attorney disagrees with the position the client is advocating, but is not required under Rule 1.16 to decline the representation, may be accused of discriminating against the client under Proposed Rule 8.4(g).” Tenn. Att’y Gen. Letter, supra note 40, at 11.
92 See Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 5.
93 McGinniss, supra note 9, at 207-209.
they may or must withdraw from representation” but not when they “are permitted to decline client representation,” Model Rule 8.4(g) seems only to allow what was already required, not declinations that are discretionary. Dean McGinniss warns that “if state bar authorities consider a lawyer’s declining representation . . . as ‘manifest[ing] bias or prejudice,’ they may choose to prosecute the lawyer for violating their codified Model Rule 8.4(g).”

The New York State Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics issued an opinion in January 2017 that concluded that “[a] lawyer is under no obligation to accept every person who may wish to become a client unless the refusal to accept a person amounts to unlawful discrimination.” The facts before the Committee were that a lawyer had been requested to represent a claimant against a religious institution. Because the lawyer was of the same religion as the institution, he or she was unwilling to represent the claimant against the institution. Calling the definition of “unlawful discrimination” for purposes of New York’s Rule 8.4(g) a question of law beyond its jurisdiction, the Committee declined to “opine on whether a lawyer’s refusal to represent a prospective client in a suit against the lawyer’s own religious institution constitutes ‘unlawful discrimination’” for purposes of New York’s Rule 8.4(g).

In Stropnicky v. Nathanson, the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination found a law firm that specialized in representing women in divorce cases had violated state nondiscrimination law when it refused to represent a man. As these examples demonstrate, reasonable doubt exists that Rule 1.16 provides adequate protection for attorneys’ ability to accept, decline, or withdraw from a representation.

VIII. Does the Attorney Disciplinary Board have adequate resources to be the tribunal of first resort for an increased number of discrimination and harassment claims, including employment discrimination claims?

Concerns have been expressed by some state bar disciplinary counsel as to whether bar disciplinary offices have adequate financial and staff resources for adjudicating complex harassment and discrimination claims, particularly of employment discrimination claims. For example, The Montana Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) voiced concerns about the breadth of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The ODC quoted from a February 23, 2016, email from the

94 Id. at 207-208 & n.146, citing Stephen Gillers, supra note 56, at 231-32, as, in Dean McGinniss’ words, “conceding that the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ concerns about religious lawyers’ loss of freedom in client selection under Model Rule 8.4(g) are well founded, though not a basis for objecting to the rule.”


96 Id. New York’s Rule 8.4(g) was adopted before ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and is narrower.


98 Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 5, in “§ 8.4-2(j)-2. The New Rule 8.4 and the Free Speech Problems It May Raise.”

99 Office of Disciplinary Counsel, In re the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: ODC’s Comments re ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), filed in Montana Supreme Court, No. AF 09-0688 (Apr. 10, 2017), at 3,
National Organization of Bar Counsel (“NOBC”) to its members explaining that the NOBC Board had declined to take a position on then-proposed ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) because “there were a number of simple regulatory issues, not the least of which is the possibility of diverting already strained resources to investigate and prosecute these matters.”

The Montana ODC thought that “any unhappy litigant” could claim that opposing counsel had discriminated on the basis of “one or more of the types of discrimination named in the rule.” The ODC also observed that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) did not require “that a claim be first brought before an appropriate regulatory agency that deals with discrimination.” In that regard, the ODC recommended that the court consider “Illinois’ rule [that] makes certain types of discrimination unethical and subject to discipline” because it required that “the lawyer disciplinary process cannot be initiated until there is a finding to that effect by a court or administrative agency” and required that “the conduct must reflect adversely on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.”

In December 2016, the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania identified two defects of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g). The first was the rule’s “potential for Pennsylvania’s lawyer disciplinary authority to become the tribunal of first resort for workplace harassment or discrimination claims against lawyers.” The second defect was that “after careful review and consideration … the breadth of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) will pose difficulties for already resource-strapped disciplinary authorities.” The Board at that time concluded that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) was too broad:

It is our opinion, after careful review and consideration, that the breadth of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) will pose difficulties for already resource-strapped disciplinary authorities. The Model Rule . . . subjects to discipline not only a lawyer who knowingly engages in harassment or discrimination, but also a lawyer who negligently utters a derogatory or demeaning comment. A lawyer who did not know that a comment was offensive will be disciplined if the lawyer should have known that it was.

Thus, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) generates several new concerns. Increased demand may drain the limited resources of the Attorney Disciplinary Board as it serves as the tribunal of first
resort for an increased number of discrimination and harassment claims against lawyers and law firms. Serious questions arise about the evidentiary or preclusive effects that a state bar proceeding might have on other tribunals’ proceedings. State bar tribunals have their own rules of procedure and evidence that may be significantly different from state and federal court rules. Often, discovery is more limited in bar proceedings than in civil court. And, of course, there is no right to a jury trial in state bar proceedings.

An attorney may be disciplined regardless of whether her conduct is a violation of any other law. Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski warn that Rule 8.4(g) “may discipline the lawyer who does not violate any statute or regulation [except Rule 8.4(g)] dealing with discrimination.”107 Nor is “an allegedly injured party [required] to first invoke the civil legal system” before a lawyer can be charged with discrimination or harassment.108

The threat of a complaint under Model Rule 8.4(g) could also be used as leverage in other civil disputes between a lawyer and a former client. Model Rule 8.4(g) even may be the basis of an implied private right of action against an attorney. Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski note this risk:

If lawyers do not follow this proposed Rule, they risk discipline (e.g., disbarment, or suspension from the practice of law). In addition, Courts enforce the Rules in the course of litigation (e.g., sanctions, disqualification). Courts also routinely imply private rights of action from violation of the Rules – malpractice and tort suits by third parties (non-clients).109

Unsurprisingly, Professor Rotunda and Professor Dzienkowski disagree with the rule’s proponents that lawyers “should rely on prosecutorial discretion because disciplinary boards do not have the resources to prosecute every violation.” They warn that “[d]iscretion, however, may lead to abuse of discretion, with disciplinary authorities going after lawyers who espouse unpopular ideas.”110

A lawyer’s loss of his or her license to practice law is a staggering penalty and demands a stringent process, one in which the standards for enforcement are clear and respectful of the attorneys’ rights, as well as the rights of others. ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) does not provide the clear enforcement standards that are necessary when the loss of one’s livelihood is at stake.

107 Rotunda & Dzienkowski, supra note 3 (parenthetical in original).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
Conclusion

Because ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) and, therefore, Proposed Rule 32:8.4(g) could drastically chill lawyers’ freedom to express their viewpoints on political, social, religious, and cultural issues, and for the additional reasons given in this letter, they should be rejected. At a minimum, the Court should wait to see whether the widespread prediction that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) will operate as a speech code for attorneys is borne out if and when it is adopted in other states. There is no reason to make Iowa attorneys the laboratory subjects in the ill-conceived experiment that ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) represents. A decision to reject ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) can always be revisited, but the damage its premature adoption may do to Iowa attorneys cannot be undone.

The Christian Legal Society thanks the Court for holding this public comment period and considering its comments.

Respectfully submitted,

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